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Corporate Cooperation, Relationship
Management, and the Trialogical
Imperative for Corporate Law*
John H. Matheson** and Brent A. Olson***
The board of directors... is located at two critical corporate inter-
faces-the interface between the owners of the enterprise and its man-
agement, and the interface between the corporation and the larger
society. The directors are stewards-stewards of the owners' interest
in the enterprise and stewards also of the owners' legal and ethical
obligations to other groups affected by corporate activity.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
For large publicly held corporations, 2 "corporate govern-
* The authors would like to thank Tracy N. Tool for his helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Of Counsel, Kaplan,
Strangis & Kaplan, P.A.
*** J.D., 1991, M.B.A., 1993, University of Minnesota.
1. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE ROLE AND CoMPosrToN OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATION, reprinted in 33
Bus. LAW. 2083, 2096 (1978) [hereinafter BusINEss ROUNDTABLE 1978. In ar-
ticulating this remarkable definition of the board of directors, the Roundtable
adopted the seminal view of the board as a steward for shareholders' interests
while serving as an "interface" between shareholders and nonshareholders.
Consistent with this definition, the Roundtable recognized that it might be nec-
essary to give shareholders an explicit right to nominate directors. Id. at 2095.
2. This Article focuses on large publicly held corporations. The American
Law Institute (ALI) defines "publicly held corporation" as a corporation with
"both 500 or more record holders of its equity securities and $5 million or more
of total assets." See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCnILES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.31 (Proposed Final Draft, Mar.
31, 1992) [hereinafter ALI PRoJEcT]. The ALI defines "large publicly held cor-
poration" as a corporation with two thousand or more shareholders and
$100,000,000 or more total assets. See id. § 1.24. The Securities and Exchange
Commission uses similar classifications. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
subjects issuers to special regulation if they have total assets exceeding one
million dollars and a class of equity securities held of record by five hundred or
more persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988) [hereinafter the "1934 Exchange
Act"]. The regulations require that the corporation register that class of shares
with the SEC and submit periodic financial information. See 1934 Exchange
Act § 12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B). Rule 12g-1 exempts from registration
requirements issuers whose total assets do not exceed five million dollars. See
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ance,"3 a common term in current law review articles, 4 is an out-
dated term. It is outdated because it emphasizes the tensions
and power struggles between corporate constituencies and im-
plies an inevitable and immutable governance tug-of-war.5 It is
also outdated because it masks the economic reality of the corpo-
rate enterprise: that the raison d'etre of large publicly held cor-
porations is to maximize "longterm shareholder"6 and corporate
value. Finally, it is outdated because today's globally competi-
tive marketplace requires a corporate focus on long-term per-
id. § 12(g)(1); see also FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 402(a) (1980) (requiring re-
gistration if a corporation has over one million dollars in assets and over five
hundred holders of securities).
3. The term "corporate governance" embodies the basic allocation of pow-
ers and duties among shareholders and nonshareholders. For purposes of this
article, "nonshareholders" includes directors, officers and "stakeholders." See
generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw §§ 3.1 - 3.5 (1986) (outlining the
basic allocation of powers and duties of shareholders and nonshareholders).
4. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703 (1989);
Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and
Means, 22 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 19 (1988); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881; Mel-
vin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461
(1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VA .D. L.
REV. 1259 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement];
Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982)
[hereinafter Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"]; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Ro-
senblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election
of Directors, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 187 (1991); Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the
Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALrs Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
511 (1984); Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeter-
minacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 551 (1987); Elliott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the
ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1984).
As to the nature and function of corporate law generally, see ALI PROJECT,
supra note 2; Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TX. L.
REV. 865 (1990).
5. Ever since the takeover decade of the 1980s, during which corporate
raiders mounted challenges against incumbent management, the concept of
"corporate governance" has carried a war-like connotation, suggesting share-
holders pitted against nonshareholders.
6. The authors intend to use "longterm" as a term of art when in conjuc-
tion with shareholder ("longterm shareholder") and stakeholder ("longterm
stakeholder")-thus, the lack of hyphenation. For background of longterm
shareholders and longterm stakeholders, see John H. Matheson & Brent A. Ol-
son, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Govern-
ance, 76 MIN. L. REV. 1313 (1992).
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formance rather than on divisive factionalism. Accordingly, this
Article suggests steps toward minimizing corporate law's preoc-
cupation with "corporate governance" in favor of a new concept:
"corporate cooperation."
Corporate law and contemporary corporate law reform pro-
posals proceed from a fundamentally flawed framework, which
depicts management, shareholders, and stakeholders as inher-
ently and inexorably antagonistic. As a result, the United
States is in the midst of a corporate law revolution. For the
most part, directors of publicly held corporations do not under-
stand their roles and particularly their relationships with large
institutional shareholders 7-despite the fact that institutional
shareholders own over fifty percent of all equity securities.8 For
several decades, directors have insulated themselves and man-
agement from shareholder accountability, eschewing any real ef-
fort to assimilate shareholders into the corporate activity
fabric.9 This anachronistic anti-shareholder attitude will not
survive in an era in which shareholders, armed with a revamped
proxy system,10 are determined to be heard.
Shareholder activism is changing. Longterm shareholders
now realize the need to focus on long-term value maximization
to ensure satisfactory corporate performance. Longterm share-
holders" invest in a corporation expecting their share owner-
ship to engender more than a mere monetary stake. These
shareholders expect to have a relationship with the corporation,
its board, its management, and other longterm stakeholders.
Just as marriage is more than a "transaction," a longterm share-
holder's commitment to a corporation is more than a monetary
"transaction"; both envision a long-term relationship.
Corporate law reform must ultimately focus on how to rede-
fine the role of directors 12 to maximize long-term corporate
value. Although several proposals purport to resolve this gov-
7. See infra Part ll.C.2.b. (discussing institutional shareholders).
8. See Dan Cordtz, Corporate Hangmen, Fmr. WoRLD, March 30, 1993, at
24, 25 (noting that institutional investors control "54% of the stock in U.S.
corporations").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing management
entrenchment).
10. For a discussion of this new proxy system, see infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part IV.E (discussing longterm shareholders).
12. "In the corporate governance debate, all arguments ultimately con-
verge on the role of the board of directors in general, and on the role of outside
directors in particular." Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STN. L. REv. 863,
873 (1991).
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ernance conundrum, 13 none adequately addresses the role of the
board in a world populated by the new species of shareholder,
the longterm shareholder. This Article attempts to fill the void.
As the centerpiece of corporate law,14 boards are fiduciaries
for, and are accountable to, the shareholders-the corporation's
primary constituency. 15 Contemporary corporate law endows
boards with two primary functions: monitoring and manage-
ment. The law is oblivious, however, to a potentially far more
significant board function, the "relationship management" func-
tion. This Article posits that an effective corporate cooperation
regime requires that contemporary boards undertake this "rela-
tionship management" function.
The essence of an effective relationship is communication.
Consistent with the role of relationship management, the board
of directors, longterm shareholders, and other stakeholders
must engage in dialogue-or, more accurately, "trialogue"16-to
function effectively. This is the trialogical imperative that flows
from the board's relationship management role.
This Article sets forth a legal paradigm designed to facili-
tate a cooperative corporate law regime that will maximize long-
term corporate value. This new paradigm comprises three key
players: the board of directors, longterm shareholders, and long-
term stakeholders, including senior management. In contrast to
the old governance paradigm characterized by atomized owner-
ship, pervasive investor apathy, and hostile control battles, this
new legal paradigm emphasizes ongoing communication and co-
operation among the key players.
This Article argues that, of the three key players, the board
is the appropriate organ for mediating between the other long-
term players to set a course for maximizing the long-term wel-
fare of the corporation, its shareholders, and its constituencies.
13. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the major governance reform proposal
proffered this decade).
14. Corporate law generally decrees that "[all corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corpo-
ration managed under the direction of, its board of directors." MODEL BusINss
CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1991).
15. See, e.g., Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Direc-
tors, 21 STETSON L. Rv. 197, 199 (1991) (noting that "[tlhe fiduciary duty of
directors is perhaps the most powerful and important concept underlying the
corporate system. The reason is our belief that those who exercise power should
be accountable to those who are affected by it.").
16. See WEBsTER's THIR NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2440 (una-
bridged, 1986) (defining "trialogue" as a "discourse[ ] or colloquy in which three
persons share").
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To implement this proposal successfully, the board, or a commit-
tee of the board, will mediate among competing factions. As the
master controller of the enterprise, the board will serve as the
central information processor between longterm shareholders
and stakeholders. Meanwhile, the longterm shareholders and
longterm stakeholders, if given appropriate access, will ensure
that the board possesses the requisite expertise, authority, and
resources to make informed decisions that optimize the players'
mutual long-term interests. In this sense, the board will become
a significantly more important and powerful element in synthe-
sizing and coalescing the goals of a corporation.
Institutional investors promise to become an integral ele-
ment of the proposed board-centered governance regime. To
monitor and mediate fundamental finance and governance is-
sues effectively, the board needs a great deal of information,
much of which institutional investors can supply. Who better to
provide information on longterm shareholders' interests than
those shareholders themselves? As one commentator notes,
"[ilnstitutional investors are perhaps the strongest force for re-
form ever to emerge in the history of boards."17
Part II of this Article sets forth the contemporary corporate
governance landscape. It outlines the three key players in the
corporate governance triad. It describes the central importance
of the board of directors in corporate governance, explaining why
the board continues to be the master controller of the corporate
machine. This Part analyzes the promise and limits of in-
dependent outside directors and concludes that they are a neces-
sary but insufficient element of effective corporate reform. It
also describes the roles of shareholders and stakeholders, the re-
maining two elements of the corporate governance triad.
Part III explores rays of hope on the current "corporate gov-
ernance" horizon. It suggests that reforms giving shareholders
greater voice, although aimed in the right direction, suffer from
the same shortcomings as other reform proposals. That is, they
continue to rely on the "corporate governance" framework of
ages past and ignore the potent and inevitable forces of a "corpo-
rate cooperation" regime.
Part IV proposes a "corporate cooperation" regime in which
the board's function is "relationship management." This Part
articulates the need for a trialogue between the board, longterm
shareholders, and longterm stakeholders.
17. Leslie Levy, The Debate Over Corporate Governance: Past, Present and
Future, INSIGHTs, Dec. 1991, at 27, 27.
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II. "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE" AND THE
TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CORPORATE LAW
"[Ulnloved and unlamented, the corporate form now languishes, bleed-
ing and dying... "18
For more than two centuries, scholars and commentators
have predicted the demise of the publicly held corporation. In
his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith questioned the viability of
the corporation,1 9 implying that the conflict of interest between
managers and scattered, absentee shareholders would fatally
undermine the development of the corporation.20 In 1932, Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means cautioned that the "separation of
ownership and control" insulated corporate managers from the
discipline of competitive markets.21 Ultimately, this would
render the corporate form extinct. Similarly, the logical conclu-
sion of John Kenneth Galbraith's social reform arguments is
that America's unconstrained managers would devastate our
unregulated, free-exchange economy.22 Today's law and eco-
nomics scholars also predict the demise of the corporate form.23
The common conclusion of these commentators is that the
"agency costs"24 arising from the ownership and control dichot-
omy 25 inherent in the corporate form may cause the demise of
the public corporation.
Various corporate governance reform efforts attempt to
avert the fatality these commentators foresee. Corporate gov-
ernance reform approaches based on the "legal constraint the-
ory" seek to transcend the dichotomy between ownership and
18. Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited
Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 148 (1992).
19. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741-58 (R.H. Campbell et al.
eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
20. Id. at 741.
21. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2-6 (1932). Berle and Means also believed that the
proxy system was fatally flawed in that it provided no constraints upon man-
agement. Id. at 139.
22. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 132-33 (1983); JOHN
K. GALBRAITH, EcONOMIES AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 84-87 (1973); JOHN Ir. GAL-
BRAiTH, THE NEW INDUsTRIAL STATE 72-85 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Presser, supra note 18, at 148.
24. Michael Jensen and William Meckling originated and defined the term
"agency costs." Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308 (1976).
25. For a discussion of this dichotomy, see infra text accompanying notes
29-37.
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control by minimizing "agency costs." 26 These reformers seek to
impose legal restraints on managers to better conform their be-
havior to more economically efficient outcomes. A second ap-
proach to corporate reform, based on the "stakeholder theory,"
contrasts sharply with the "legal constraint model." The "stake-
holder theory" is a "contractarian" theory because it posits that
market forces align managers' self-interests with shareholders'
interests, enabling the corporation to transcend the dichotomy
between ownership and control. In other words, it says that
market forces adequately discipline managers by compelling
them to align their interests with those of the shareholders.27
Adherents to this theory assert that public policy should facili-
tate contracting among self-interested individuals and that legal
rules hampering the contracting process disadvantage all corpo-
rate stakeholders.28
A. THE DIALECTICAL UNDERPINNING OF CORPORATE LAw
Contemporary corporate law doctrine proceeds from the as-
sumption that corporate governance is dialectical.2 9 The best
26. The most comprehensive and self-contained reform proposal is the ti-
tanic American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations. ALI PRoJECT, supra note 2. This proposal fully embraces
the "agency cost" model. The ALI Project argues that agency costs are mini-
mized through constraints imposed by strengthening the role of liability rules
and judicial review. See id.
27. This is alternatively called the "market constraint theory" or the "con-
tractarian theory." These theories share the same goal: minimizing legal con-
straints imposed on the free-market so stakeholders can contract freely with
the corporation.
28. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs and Economic Organization, 62 A1. EcoN. REV. 777, 778 (1972); Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
289 (1980).
29. The principal basis of the corporate form is the limited liability afforded
capital providers (shareholders), whose primary incentive is to maximize corpo-
rate profitability irrespective of adverse consequences to other stakeholders. "I
weigh my words when I say that in my judgment, the limited liability corpora-
tion is the greatest single discovery of modern times." Nicolas M. Butler, Presi-
dent of Columbia University, Address at the 143d Annual Banquet of the
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911), in WILLIAM M.
FLETCHER, CYLCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917). See
generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 73-
76 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of corporate organi-
zation). Commentators have defined limited liability as "the rule that share-
holders are not liable for the obligations of the corporation beyond their capital
investment." PHn.LIP I. BLmBERG, THE LAw OF CoRPoRATE, GROUPS, SUBSTAN-
TrIVE LAw § 1.02, at 7 (1987). Corporations thus allow shareholders to reap prof-
its and dividends without personal responsibility for the consequences of
1994] 1449
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economic explanation of the dialectical nature of corporate form
is agency cost theory,30 which emphasizes the dichotomy be-
tween discretion and accountability. This dichotomy stems from
the separation of ownership and control,31 as articulated by
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their classic work, The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property.3 2 Berle and Means
claimed that shareholders are merely passive owners and that
managers provide the true locus of control amid pervasive
shareholder passivity. They predicted that the separation of
ownership and control would ultimately cause the demise of the
corporation as a form of private enterprise.3 3 Tensions between
failure. Stakeholders-including, employees, customers, suppliers, and even
communities-have no such long-term protection. They seek guarantees by the
corporation of an ongoing commitment to their welfare. In a fundamental
sense, the current governance framework pits shareholders against
nonshareholders.
30. See the seminal article by Jensen and Meckling. Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 24, at 310-11.
31. Berle and Means are the most frequently cited authority on the role of
the separation of ownership and control in corporate governance. See BERLE &
MEANs, supra note 21. Adam Smith was an early commentator on the same
subject:
The directors of [corporations], however, being the managers rather of
other people's money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which
the partners in a private col-]partner[ship] frequently watch over their
own .... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,
more or less, in the management of the affairs of [a corporation].
SMITH, supra note 19, at 741.
32. BE LnE & MFA-s, supra note 21.
33. Id. at 355-56. Because of this separation of ownership and control, di-
rectors lack incentives to maximize efficiency and shareholder welfare. In-
stead, they are saddled with interests that often diverge from those of
shareholders. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and nonshareholders
are thus the inevitable result of separation of ownership and control.
The lack of a meaningful mechanism for shareholders to select manage-
ment aggravates the conflicts of interest inherent in the corporate form. In-
deed, management is a self-perpetuating oligarchy. See Dent, supra note 4, at
881, 907. Management controls the director nomination process and the proxy
machinery. Id. at 882 ("So long as management controls proxies, corporate gov-
ernance reform efforts are doomed."). "Proxy disclosure has not led to share-
holder control; management still runs the proxy machinery and shareholders
still lack any plausible alternative to supporting management." Id. at 896.
If the shareholders are supposed to select directors, it is incongruous to
vest proxy control in incumbents seeking re-election. This is like let-
ting legislators fund their re-election campaigns from the public treas-
ury while requiring challengers to pay their own way. This system
makes the board a self-perpetuating oligarchy and, once management
controls the board, the tool for managerial control of the firm. In short,
the system generates the separation of ownership and control.
CORPORATE COOPERATION
shareholders and management are inherent in corporate
governance. 34
The dialectical nature of corporate governance appears to
have compelled the dialectical evolution of corporate law.35 In
modern corporate law's infancy, shareholder primacy
predominated.36 Shareholders had the right and power to con-
trol operation of the corporation. As corporations grew and capi-
tal markets expanded, shareholders lacked incentives to
participate actively in management. As shareholders became
more passive, they increasingly relied on corporate management
Id. at 906-07 (footnote omitted); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fis-
chel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395, 419-20 (1983) ("Sharehold-
ers' involvement in the voting process has not increased with the adoption of
the proxy rules."). Shareholder passivity and the concomitant ability of manag-
ers to control the proxy process leave owners unable to communicate or negoti-
ate effectively with management. The inefficiencies stemming from
shareholders' passive roles become part of the "agency costs" of the current gov-
ernance regime. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24.
34. The ALI Project describes the dialectical nature as follows:
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of a
corporate structure that allows management the discretion to utilize
its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time establish
safeguards in situations in which management might utilize that dis-
cretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders.
ALI PROJECT, supra note 2, introductory note to part VI, at 519; see also id.
introductory note to parts I & rH-A, at 99 (noting that there are "two highly
important social needs regarding [publicly held] corporations[:] the need to per-
mit a corporation to be highly flexible in structuring its operational manage-
ment [and] the need for processes that ensure managerial accountability to
shareholders"). Building upon this dichotomy, Professor Lyman Johnson
asserts:
[The function of corporate law should be to] confer a sufficiently wide
berth of discretion to enable management to operate creatively and
flexibly but should not be so broad that management can subvert the
ultimate objective of shareholder welfare. These dual strands of man-
agement discretion and shareholder welfare are in constant tension,
and each is poised on any given issue to check, if not negate and over-
whelm, the other.
Johnson, supra note 4, at 880.
Professor Clark writes:
ET]he role or function of the manager is to act on behalf of other per-
sons' interests. Yet power corrupts. It can be turned to [a manager's]
personal use ... in ways that hurt the other persons having claims on
the organization. The problem, then, is how to keep managers ac-
countable to their other-directed duties while nonetheless allowing
them great discretionary power over appropriate matters. This is the
major problem dealt with by corporate law.
CLARx, supra note 3, at 33-34.
35. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1323-53.
36. See infra Part II.C.2.a (describing the traditional shareholder primacy
norm).
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to run the business, supposedly in the shareholders' best
interests.
As the chasm separating shareholders from stakeholders
expanded, shareholders placed paramount importance on means
of effectively monitoring management. Corporations adopted
monitoring devices, such as the independent director. The mar-
ket for corporate control also evolved as a monitoring device.
Tender offers allowed suitors to go directly to shareholders to
determine the target corporation's fate. Nonshareholders re-
sponded dialectically by aggressively developing anti-takeover
weaponry. Their efforts culminated in the current "insulated
mangerialism" stage of corporate law.37 A chasm that grew over
decades thus separates today's shareholders from effective com-
munication with management.
B. THE EcoNoMIc AND LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE DIALECTICAL
GOVERNANCE NATURE
The past decade has witnessed marked instability and un-
rest surrounding the current governance framework. The 1980s
takeover bonanza caused havoc in corporations. Proliferation of
state-adopted and corporate-imposed anti-takeover and anti-
shareholder mechanisms, including the poison pill,38 and anti-
takeover legislation,39 similarly caused havoc with sharehold-
ers. As a result, corporate governance is undergoing a major
37. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1319-23.
38. Poison pills are stock warrants or rights that allow the holder to buy a
suitor's stock at low prices ("flip-overs") or to sell target stock to the target itself
("flip-ins"). See, e.g., P. John Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional
Crossroads: Preserving State Authority Over Internal Affairs While Protecting
the Transferability of Interstate Stock Through Federal Law, 36 UCLA L. REv.
1109, 1156-57 (1989). "If the recent trends continue, virtually all major corpo-
rations will be transformed into fortresses in the near future." Id. at 1125 n.59.
The Investor Responsibility Research Center, an independent non-profit re-
search group, found that 51% of large American companies are armored with
poison pills as of August 1990. Majority of Large U.S. Corporations Have
Adopted Poison Pills, IRRC Finds, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1659
(Nov. 30, 1990); see also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder
Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1430 n.17 (1991) (describing the purpose of "poison
pills").
39. This "extraordinary ferment of activity in the field of corporate govern-
ance" includes increased involvement by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, institutional investors, major corporate stakeholders, legislators, boards,
commentators, executives, and scholars. Roswell B. Perkins, The President's
Letter, 4 A.L.I. 1 (1982), REP. 1 quoted in Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Introduction
to the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 496
(1984).
1452
CORPORATE COOPERATION
transformation. Shareholders and even some outside directors
have become increasingly impatient with languishing corporate
performance. One sign is that outside directors of Fortune com-
panies have ousted chief executive officers as never before. Ex-
amples include General Motors, Compaq Computer, Chrysler,
and Allied-Signal. 40
The unequaled economic and social impact of the modem
corporation 4 ' helps explain why the controversy and criticism
surrounding corporate governance are intensifying. Inquiries
into methods of improving corporate governance come on the
heels of an economic recession, at a time in which the country is
experiencing heightened competition from abroad and an in-
creasing awareness that most boards ineffectively monitor man-
agement. Indeed, society's long-term welfare is at stake.42
In part because of increased shareholder activism, corporate
governance has emerged as a ripe subject for reform. As one
scholar notes:
The intensity of the corporate governance debate in the United States
... reflects a deep-seated concern with the present system. Virtually
all participants in the debate recognize that the present system will
not meet our needs in the 1990s and beyond. We cannot afford to re-
peat the financial chaos of the 1980s or the crises that inevitably follow
such a speculative frenzy. While corporate governance is only one fac-
tor in determining the success of our business corporations, it is a key
factor. It is imperative that we rebuild the corporate governance sys-
tem to promote the long-term health of the corporations that form the
backbone of our free-market economy.
43
40. Joel Chernoff, Investors Cheer GM Shake-up; Directors "have a job to
do," PENSIONS & IrEsTMENrs, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1.
41. "Today.... the corporation is the dominant form of business organiza-
tion,... account[ing] for about 89 percent of business receipts.... [O]verall,
the business corporation is the principal form for carrying out business activi-
ties in this country." CLARK, supra note 3, at 1-2. Few governance issues im-
pact as broadly and intensely on society as corporate takeovers. As such, "[nlo
current corporate issue has attracted more attention from legal and economic
scholars than takeover defensive moves by corporate managers." Larry E. Rib-
stein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 72 (1989).
42. See Martin Lipton, A Proposal for a New System of Corporate Govern-
ance: Quinquennial Election of Directors, in INsTrrUTIONAL INVESTORS: PASSIVE
FIDucAmEs To AcTIST OwNERs 61, 63-65 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 704, 1990) [hereinafter INsTITUTIONAL INVESTORS] ("The
stakes are large. Indeed, I believe that the health and vitality of our entire
economy is at risk.").
43. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 253 (emphasis added).
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An issue of growing importance is the role of increasingly active,
sophisticated, and expert institutional shareholders. 44 An effec-
tive corporate governance strategy must harness the valuable
input of major, longterm shareholders in order to maximize eco-
nomic efficiency for society's benefit. To harness this input, a
dramatically new corporate board structure must replace the
traditional board structure in which directors' primary function
seems to be one of following the lead of management.
Although "the 1980s witnessed an unprecedented develop-
ment in the law surrounding corporate governance,"45 the 1990s
may prove to be even more ground-breaking. The unveiling of
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations (hereinafter ALI Pro-
ject)46 ranks among the major governance developments of this
decade; its fifteen-year gestation yielded an impressive treatise
on corporate law and governance.47
A decade ago, when most regarded shareholder passivity as
an immutable characteristic of dispersed stock ownership, few
believed that shareholders had the ability or desire to challenge
44. "The past decade witnessed a staggering rise of institutional share
ownership with an equally dramatic increase in the concentration of sharehold-
ings." Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1354.
By 1988, institutional assets had exploded to five trillion dollars,
or 18.7% of total financial assets in the United States. In 1989, institu-
tions held forty-three percent of all equities and fifty percent of the
fifty largest companies' equity. The fifty largest institutions owned
$925 billion in stocks, or twenty-seven percent of the stock market. By
1990, institutional investors owned forty-five percent of outstanding
corporate equity... Controlling more that $2.5 trillion in assets, pen-
sion funds alone currently own more than twenty-five percent of all
publicly traded equity in U.S. companies.
Id. at 1354-55.
Numerous factors compel institutional shareholders to seek to expand their
active involvement in corporate governance issues, including the increased size
and concentration of institutional shareholders, their enhanced sophistication,
and the marked down-turn in takeovers as a means of monitoring and disciplin-
ing management. Id. at 1354.
45. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BusNmEss JUDGMENT RuLE: Ft-
DucmRy DUTms OF CORPORATE DmECTORs 1 (3d ed. 1989). The authors further
note that "[tihe early 1990s will likely prove an equally active period...." Id. at
41.
46. See ALI PRoJECT, supra note 2.
47. In addition, commentators advanced three significant corporate gov-
ernance proposals during this decade. The Lipton/Rosenblum proposal recom-
mends extending board terms to five years. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 4,
at 224-30. The Gilson/Kraakman proposal recommends the infusion of "profes-
sional directors." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 883-92. The Mathe-
son/Olson proposal advocates implementing a "longterm shareholder" regime.
Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1375-81.
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corporate governance. Although shareholders of decades past
were admittedly passive and powerless, today's shareholder ac-
tivism foretells a shareholder uprising, fueled largely by the as-
cendancy of the institutional investor.48 Indeed, never has the
need for shareholder activism been more critical. The pro-
nounced downturn in takeovers this decade 49 limits the discipli-
nary force that the threat of takeovers has on management.50
48. Commentators have explained:
[We] are now witnessing the reagglomeration of ownership of the larg-
est corporations, so that long-term shareholders are well on the way to
majority ownership of America's companies. They are, of course, the
institutional shareholders, who invest collections of individuals' assets
through pension funds, trusts, insurance companies, and other
entities.
ROBERT A. MONKS & NELL MINow, POWER AND AccouNTABiuTY 18 (1991).
"Notwithstanding major differences among them, institutional investors,
as a group, have vastly expanded their economic sphere of influence in a
number of important ways. Moreover, while they may be diverse, a high con-
centration of economic power resides among a relatively small and extraordina-
rily stable group of institutions." Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of
Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary of Research at the Co-
lumbia Institutional Investor Project, in INsTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note
42, at 406-07.
49. See Mergers, Acquisition Activity Fell 18% in 1st Quarter, Hitting an
11-Year Low, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1991, at A2 ("Merger and acquisition activ-
ity plummeted to an 11-year low in the first quarter [of 1991], with the number
of transactions off 18% from a year earlier.... continuing the decline that ap-
peared in 1990 when potential deals fell 12% from 1989."); see also Mergers at
an 11-year Low, N.Y. TIo.s, Apr. 18, 1991, at D10 (describing the same drop in
merger and acquisition activity).
No governance issue has received more attention than the impact of take-
overs and anti-takeover weaponry upon shareholders and nonshareholders.
See generally ALAN J. AUERBACH, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES (1988) (collecting articles about takeovers and their impact upon cor-
porate boards and management); HOsTIE TAKEOVERS: ISSUES IN PUBLIc AND
CORPORATE PoUcY (David L. McKee ed., 1989) (same); KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND
TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HosTrLE TAKEOVER (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds.,
1988) (same).
50. "It is impossible to overstate how deeply the market for corporate con-
trol has changed the attitudes and practices of U.S. managers.... [That mar-
ket] represents the most effective check on management autonomy ever
devised." Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation,
HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96, 100; see, e.g., James A. White, Share-
holder-Rights Movement Sways a Number of Big Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr.
4, 1991, at C1 (describing corporate concessions to shareholder demands).
Nell Minow of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., a Washington proxy
consultant, believes that "this yearF[s shareholder activism] is unusual because
the takeover activity that fueled momentum for [corporate governance] propos-
als in other years hasn't been there." Id. Compare Lipton & Rosenblum, supra
note 4, at 198 ("the hostile takeover is not a particularly effective or efficient
means of motivating or disciplining managers") with Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 12, at 870-71 ("Given the contribution of hostile takeovers to portfo-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1443
As a result of increased shareholder activism, current corporate
doctrine and practice border on obsolescence. Corporate law re-
form is both necessary and inevitable.
C. THE CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE TRIAD
Contemporary corporate law is not a simple dichotomy of
management and shareholders; rather, it is a complex set of re-
lationships between the corporation's board of directors and var-
ious constituencies, primarily the shareholders and
stakeholders. These three groups constitute the corporate gov-
ernance triad.51
1. The Board of Directors
There is one thing all boards have in common[:] they do not
function.5
2
a. The Nature of Board Authority
The most salient legal and economic characteristic of corpo-
rate governance is the concentration of decision-making author-
ity in the board. The corporate board is the focal point of the
corporation: management's role is derivative of the board's-the
lio values during the 1980s, institutional investors were quite right to target
defensive tactics in their initial foray into the corporate governance debate....
[Nevertheless, t]he hostile takeover has proved to be an expensive and inexact
monitoring device.. ").
51. Consistent with its dialectical nature, corporate governance has a dia-
lectical structure: shareholders provide capital but lack control; managers
wield control but bear no risk exposure. Directors provide oversight. From
management's perspective, authority must have independence and discretion to
function effectively and creatively-the more the better. Moreover, as dis-
cussed below, centralizing authority is necessary to maximize the efficient
processing of information. If, however, authority is not held accountable to the
asset owners (i.e., shareholders), the exercise of discretion may run contrary to
the shareholders' wishes. Furthermore, reducing discretion by increasing re-
sponsibility diminishes the value of authority. This leads to an analogous para-
dox: the dichotomy between authority and responsibility. While the dichotomy
between ownership and control focuses on the shareholder, with dispersed
share ownership causing an inevitable shareholder passivity, the paradox be-
tween authority and responsibility focuses on the board. When it focuses on the
board, corporate law seeks to centralize authority for efficiency reasons; cen-
tralized authority is not a mere by-product of shareholder passivity.
52. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT, TASKS, RESPONSIBILrrIEs, PRACTICES
628 (1974), quoted in Judith H. Dobrzynski, Taking Charge: Corporate Direc-
tors Start to Flex Their Muscle, Bus. Wy-, July 3, 1989, at 66 (emphasis
omitted).
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shareholders' role is reactive.53 In centralizing corporate au-
thority and information processing in the board while granting
shareholders merely a passive, reactive role, corporate law seeks
to minimize the costs of corporate decision making.
Even when statutes require shareholder approval of certain
board actions, such as amendments to the articles of incorpora-
tion or fundamental corporate reorganizations, usually the
board must first approve the proposal. 54 Shareholders may only
vote when directors present them with matters; they may not
amend board proposals. Indeed, the only significant source of
shareholder power over the board is the right to replace board
members. Shareholders, however, rarely exercise this option.
Both competitive forces and monitoring forces limit board
discretion. Competitive forces include the product market, the
internal and external markets for managers, and, ultimately,
the market for corporate control. These forces tend to align the
interests of managers with the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.55 Supporters of this model heavily emphasize the invisible
hand of the marketplace, which they believe compels managers
to align their conduct with shareholders' interests, lest the value
of the corporate enterprise diminish.56 Corporations that per-
53. This board-centered corporate governance system accords well with
Kenneth Arrow's "authority" model. KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LImIrs OF ORGAN-
IZATION (1974). Arrow's model has twin foci: individuals' incentives and indi-
viduals' control over information. Id. at 69-70. Given identical information and
incentives, each member of an organization will reach decisions by "consensus"
because each member voting in her own self-interest will be motivated to select
the outcome preferred by others. Id. at 69. Given divergent information and
incentives, it is infeasible for all members to partake actively in the decision
making process; individual members lack both the information and incentives
to arrive at optimal group decisions. Id. at 70. It is thus cheaper and more
efficient to process information centrally. Id.
54. E.g., Model Business Corp. Act §§ 10.03(b) (1991) (prior board approval
for amendments to the articles of incorporation); § 11.03(b) (same for mergers);
§ 12.02(b) (same for sale of substantially all corporate assets); § 14.02(b) (same
for voluntary dissolution of corporation).
55. Some scholars claim that managerial discretion is adequately checked
by three forces: capital market discipline caused by managers' incentive to sell
stock for maximum value, labor market discipline involving ex post evaluation
of managers, and product market discipline. See, e.g., Fama, supra note 28, at
292-97. These "contractarians" further argue that corporate law need not be
mandatory because these competitive forces align shareholder and non-
shareholder interests optimally, in effect "uniting" ownership and control. See
Black, supra note 4, at 579 (presenting the contractarian arguments and offer-
ing rebuttal arguments).
56. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract 89 COL. L. REv. 1416, 1419 (1989) ("Managers may do their best to
take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market
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suade shareholders they offer the highest return garner the
largest investments. Thus, only corporations that make inves-
tor-friendly choices prosper relative to others.57
Monitoring forces are rules that constrain managerial dis-
cretion. They include the rules the law imposes on corporate ac-
tors that attempt to hold them accountable to shareholders. The
most familiar manifestations of monitoring forces are independ-
ent auditors and outside directors.58 The derivative suit, an-
other monitoring device, is a method by which corporate law
imposes liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. Free market
proponents claim that these rules are unnecessary to the extent
that market forces adequately curb managerial discretion.59
A wealth of scholarship60 and case laws' addresses this
monitoring model, which arguably limits managerial discretion
by conforming managerial conduct to shareholders' wishes. Ac-
cording to the monitoring model, corporate governance provides
mechanisms that minimize agency costs by guaranteeing that
management conduct is directed toward maximizing share-
holder value.
drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at heart. It is almost as if
there were an invisible hand.").
57. See id. at 1421.
58. Outside directors, independent of management, will monitor manage-
ment activities for the benefit of shareholders.
59. See Black, supra note 4, at 578-79 ("Manager constraining rules will be
unimportant if market forces are adequate to curb managerial discretion.").
60. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 878-79
(1981) (proposing a rule that constrains management's ability to interfere with
shareholders' tender offer decisions); Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-18
(1988) (proposing that institutional shareholders nominate roughly 25% of the
board in order to maximize shareholder participation in corporate governance).
Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161,
1191, 1201 (1981) (advocating managerial passivity amid takeovers to maxi-
mize shareholder value) with Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facil-
itating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982) (advocating an
auctioneering model, rather than a passivity model, wherein target managers
seek to solicit competing bids).
61. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th
Cir. 1986) (primary criterion for adjudging the legality of poison pills is "the
goal of stockholder wealth maximization"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69
(1987); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182,
184 n.16 (Del. 1986) (interests of shareholders become directors' sole concern
when company is for sale); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders.").
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b. Role of Outside Directors
The independent outside director is a cornerstone of current
corporate governance polemic. As of 1987, seventy-four percent
of the directors of publicly held corporations were not company
employees.62 Ideally, independent directors function as share-
holder surrogates to ensure that the corporation pursues the
long-term best interests of its owners.
Support for independent directors is widespread. Courts
stress the importance of outside directors in providing objective
oversight and reasoned business judgment.63 The Council of
Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association also em-
phasizes the central role of outside directors.64 In addition, the
Business Roundtable advises that outside directors constitute
no less than a "critical mass."65 The Corporate Director's Guide-
book of the American Bar Association recommends "non-man-
agement" directors in any committees of the board.6 6 Since its
inception, the ALI Project has recommended that boards of large
public corporations include specified proportions of directors
who are "free of any significant relationships with the corpora-
tion's senior executives."6 7 Institutional investors recently filed
proxy resolutions with many firms demanding that a majority of
62. See JAY W. LoRscH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALIrY OF AMERICA'S
CORPORATE BOARDS 17 (1989).
63. E.g., Moran v. Golter, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
MESA Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
64. See E. Norman Veasey & Jesse A. Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute
Allows Limits on Director Liability and Modernizes Indemnification Protection,
Bus. LAw. UPDATE July-Aug. 1986, at 1, 2-3.
65. Busiss RouNDTABLE 1978, supra note 1, at 2108.
66. CoMMTTEE ON CoRPoRATE LAws, ABA, CORPORATE DmECTOR's GUIDE-
BOOv, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAw. 1595, 1625-27 (1978).
67. ALI PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3A.01 (cross-references omitted). The first
draft required that large, publicly held corporations have boards with a major-
ity of such directors. AimRicAN LAw INsTrrUTE, PRINcrPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03
(Tentative Draft No. 1) (1982). In 1984, this requirement was changed to a
"recommendation of [good] corporate practice." AMERICAN LAw INsTrTUTE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04
(TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2) (1984).
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directors be independent of management.68 Louis Lowenstein
would allow shareholders to control some directorships.69
Although independent directors are an essential component
of an optimal governance structure, installing independent di-
rectors is but a first step. The facial "independence" of directors
resolves only part of the conflict of interest between manage-
ment and shareholders. Managers "can easily find directors
who are neither subordinates, relatives, nor suppliers, who will
support almost anything that the executives propose, and who
will resign in extreme cases rather than oppose the executives
who have invited them to the board."70
Even with nominating committees composed of independent
directors, management controls the selection of directors. Man-
agement generally may also veto candidates. Even more troub-
ling, most outside directors, aware of management's ability to
influence board composition, naturally mesh their decision mak-
ing with that of management.71 Indeed, because approximately
two-thirds of outside directors are CEOs, 72 they are unlikely to
monitor the CEO more energetically than they believe their own
boards should monitor them. Finally, outside directors are not
socially independent. One scholar writes, "[n]o definition of in-
dependence yet offered precludes an independent director from
being a social friend of, or a member of the same clubs, associa-
tions, or charitable efforts as, the persons whose [performance]
he is asked to assess."73
One often-cited example of independent outside directors'
inability to constrain self-interested behavior is the use of "Spe-
cial Litigation Committees." These committees, which consist of
independent directors, determine whether corporations should
consummate a shareholder derivative suit against their officers
68. Hillary Durgin, Fighting For Independence, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 1, 38 (noting that the issue of insider boards tops the corporate
governance agenda). Similarly, in an effort to garner support in its proxy fight
with Carl Icahn, Texaco's management agreed to select one board member from
a slate of directors provided by the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS). See, e.g., James Flanigan, Texaco Stresses the "Share" in
"Shareholders", L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1989, at D1.
69. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 60, at 209-18.
70. Alfred A. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 129 (1988) (citation omitted).
71. "All too often... [independent directors] turn out to be more independ-
ent of shareholders than they are of management." Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 12, at 873.
72. LoRSCH, supra note 62, at 18.
73. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village? 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 613 (1982).
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or directors. One study noted that "although there have been
more than a score of special litigation committee cases.... in all
but one the committee concluded that the suit in question was
not in the corporation's best interest."74
Today, even totally independent directors face many obsta-
cles to the decision-making process. First, outside directors
"lack an affirmative incentive to monitor effectively."75 One
study suggests that boards react, rather than manage; they
render advice when solicited and replace the chief executive of-
ficer only in dire emergencies. 76 In addition, the recent develop-
ment of the multiconstituency concept leaves directors uncertain
when faced with an issue that potentially affects different con-
stituencies differently. Finally, under current statutes and case
law, directors lack incentives to seek shareholder input. The
modern corporate framework envisions that directors, not share-
holders, control policy decisions. Shareholder input is not re-
quired and therefore does not factor significantly into the
decision-making process. In short, even the most independent of
directors shun shareholder input. For these reasons, independ-
ent directors are an insufficient remedy to the current ills of cor-
porate governance.
2. Shareholders
a. Traditional Shareholder Primacy Model
The traditional shareholder primacy model of the corpora-
tion derives from the concept that, as owners of the corporation,
shareholders are entitled to control its destiny, determine its
fundamental policies, and decide whether to make fundamental
changes in corporate policy and practice. One encapsulation of
the shareholder primacy norm has been cited frequently:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in
the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
... [lit is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental bene-
74. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and The ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963.
75. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 875.
76. MYLEs L. MACE, DfEcTORs: My-ru AND REArr 13-19, 178-80 (1971).
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fit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others
77
This governance regime derives from a time when shareholders
were "real owners" intimately involved with the operations of
the corporation,78 when institutional investors were scarce and
most corporations were owned by individuals who were typically
founders or joint owners. 79 Stakeholder interests were recog-
nized only after and to the extent the shareholders so
determined.80
The viability of the shareholder primacy theory derives from
economic theory; it says that shareholders' unfettered pursuit of
maximum profits8l promotes economic efficiency and, collater-
ally, social welfare.8 2 Corporate law accordingly endows share-
holders with various rights, including the right to elect the
board of directors, to vote on certain corporate transactions, and
to rely on the fiduciary duties of directors to manage the corpo-
ration in the shareholders' best interests.8 3 The shareholder
vote traditionally has been the primary mechanism for share-
holder control over director decisions.8 4 Shareholders vote to re-
77. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
78. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VismLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AImmIcAN BusImss 9-10 (1977) (describing the time when
"owners managed and managers owned").
79. See Lipton, supra note 42, at 64.
80. Thus, shareholders may allow the corporation to be bound by contract,
to employees, suppliers or creditors. Alternatively, the shareholders may exer-
cise a degree of conscience, or philanthropy, by donating corporate resources to
or for the benefit of needy or worthy organizations or individuals.
81. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 299-302 (rev. ed. 1967); see also Matheson & Olson,
supra note 38, at 1470 (describing the nature and role of shareholders in the
modern corporation).
82. See CLARK, supra note 3, at 389. Clark justifies shareholder primacy as
follows:
From an economic point of view, there is a strong argument that the
power to control a business firm's activities should reside in those who
have the right to the firm's residual earnings .... The intuition behind
this argument is that giving control to the residual claimants will place
the power to monitor the performance of participants in the firm and
the power to control shirking, waste, and so forth in the hands of those
who have the best incentive to use the power.
Id. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 28 (describing managers as
agents of investors); Jensen & Mecking, supra note 24 (describing generally
how principals seek to limit agency costs by limiting divergent interests be-
tween principal and agent).
83. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A (1992).
84. "Voting rights of shareholders are a major element in the structure of
corporate law . . . ." Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for
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move directors 85 and to effect fundamental corporate changes.
For example, shareholders must vote on mergers, 86 dissolu-
tions,8 7 or sales of substantially all of a corporation's assets.88
The shareholder-approved board, through its designated of-
ficers,8 9 is presumed to act as a surrogate for, and in the inter-
ests of, the shareholders. Justifications given for shareholders'
primary voice in the governance of corporate affairs distill to one
concept: shareholders are well suited to guide and discipline di-
rectors and managers.
b. Ascendancy of the Institutional Shareholder
The 1990s have witnessed a staggering increase in institu-
tional share ownership with an equally dramatic increase in the
concentration of shareholdings. In 1990, institutional investors
owned 45% of outstanding corporate equity.90 By 1993, that fig-
ure had swelled to beyond 54%.9 3 Pension funds, the largest
class of institutional investors, owned roughly 44% of all institu-
tional holdings in 1987.92 Controlling more that $2.5 trillion in
assets, pension funds currently own more than 25% of all pub-
licly traded equity in U.S. companies. 9 3 This is particularly
noteworthy because, on average, a pension fund holds any given
stock in its portfolios for two and one-half years.9 4
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1073
(1990) (citation omitted).
85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991).
86. See id. § 251 (c) (1991).
87. See id. § 275 (1991).
88. See id. § 271 (1991).
89. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPORATION 1 (1976).
90. Richard H. Koppes & Kayla J. Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Com-
mittee, DmEcroRs & BOARDS, Spring 1991, at 29, 29. By 1988, institutional
assets had exploded to five trillion dollars, or 18.7% of total United States fi-
nancial assets. Clifford L. Whitewall, Institutional Ownership, in INST=TU-
TIoNAL INVEsTORS, supra note 42, at 406-07. In contrast, institutional assets
amounted to $107 billion or 8.4% of total U.S. financial assets. In 1989, institu-
tions held 43% of all equities and 50% of the 50 largest companies' equity.
Brancato, supra note 48, at 406. The fifty largest institutions owned $925 bil-
lion in stocks, or 27% of the stock market. See The Institutional Investor 300:
Ranking America's Top Money Managers, in INsTTUTIONAL INVESTORS supra
note 42, at 137, 173. Percentages are based on the Wilshire 5000 Index.
91. Cordtz, supra note 8, at 25.
92. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 29.
93. Id.
94. See James A. White, Pension Funds Try to Retire Idea That They Are
Villains, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1990, at C1.
Investments in common stock by state and local pension systems ballooned
from $10.1 billion in 1970 to $150.2 billion in 1986 and to an estimated $240
billion in institutional holdings in 1990. Whitewall, supra note 90, at 75, 79.
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The primary impetus for increased shareholder activism
likely stems from shareholders' increased ownership concentra-
tion.95 Voting power is increasingly concentrated in a small
number of major institutions. In 1989, the top twenty funds and
top ten money managers controlled 16% of all equity; by the year
2000, they may control between 22% to 29% of the equity in the
top ten corporations. 96 The twenty largest pension funds ac-
count for more than 25% of all pension assets. The top twenty
funds thus control at least 7.7% of the outstanding stock of
American's ten largest corporations.97
Increasingly concentrated share ownership drives institu-
tional activism in two ways. First, institutions that own a large
stake in a corporation are less able to sell their shares and take
the "Wall Street walk."98 As James Martin of College Retire-
ment Equities Fund (CREF) attests, 'We're the quintessential
long-term investors."99 In addition, a greater stake means a
greater incentive to invest time and resources in improving cor-
porate monitoring and performance. 100 Finally, institutional in-
vestors' size and share concentration enhance their ability to
monitor and discipline management. The marked increase in
management entrenchment that has accompanied the death of
the takeover era, however, probably also fuels shareholder
activism.
Although equity holdings of private pension funds have been relatively stable
since 1982, state and local government pension holdings have increased mark-
edly; in 1988, they owned a total of $223.7 billion in stocks, or 9.1% of the
NYSE's total market value. See id.
95. July Client Advisory Letter, in INsTITUTIONAL INVEsToRS supra note 42,
at 34.
96. William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HAnv. Bus.
REv., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 72.
97. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 29.
98. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at 1477-82 (describing behavior
differences between institutional investors and individual investors).
99. David Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemen, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1989,
at 46, 46.
100. Major shareholders thus have begun to unite toward more effectively
wielding their immense power. The Council of Institutional Investors serves as
a nucleus for institutional activism. Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E.
Korens, Trends in Institutional Shareholder Activism: What the Institutions
are Doing Today, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 42, at 45, 48. Institu-
tional Shareholder Services advises large institutional investors on corporate
governance issues. Id. at 48. Analysis Group provides economic and financial
consulting services to institutional investors. Id. Analysis Group has also cre-
ated the Institutional Voting Research Service to evaluate the governance and
economic performance of large corporations. Id.
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In his comprehensive study of global competition, Michael
E. Porter identifies the growth of institutional investors in the
United States to a position of dominance over corporations as
the most significant factor in the decline of the country's
competitiveness:
Unlike institutional investors in nearly every other advanced nation,
who view their shareholdings as nearly permanent and exercise their
ownership rights accordingly, American institutions are under pres-
sure to demonstrate quarterly appreciation.... With a strong incen-
tive to find companies whose shares will appreciate in the near term
and incomplete information about long-term prospects, portfolio man-
agers turn to quarterly earnings performance as perhaps the single
biggest influence on buy/sell decisions. 10
1
Apparently, no consensus has emerged about the proper role of
institutional shareholders in modern corporate governance.
3. Stakeholders
The stakeholder perspective generally posits that managers
should seek to maximize long-term corporate health irrespective
of effects on short-term shareholder wealth.' 0 2 Accordingly,
under case law and developing modern statutes, directors may
consider many nonshareholder interests-including the inter-
ests of employees, creditors, communities, customers, and sup-
pliers-in arriving at long-term business strategies. 103
The judicial embrace of the concept of "the best interests of
the corporation" has advanced the stakeholder approach. 10 4
101. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE CoMPETrrIvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 528
(1990).
102. The chief proponent of this model is Martin Lipton. See, e.g., Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 187. "[Tlhe ultimate goal of corporate governance
is the creation of a healthy economy through the development of business oper-
ations that operate for the long term and compete successfully in the world
economy." Id. at 189. For background see, for example, William W. Bratton,
The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REv.
180 (1992); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model 61 GEo.
WASH. L. Ruv. 1156 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. Ruv. 759
(1992).
103. Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at 1448.
104. For example, the Delaware Chancery equated "shareholder long-term
interests" with "multi-constituency interests":
The knowledgeable reader will recognize that this particular phrase
masks the most fundamental issue: to what interest does the board
look in resolving conflicts between interests in the corporation that
may be characterized as "shareholder long-term interests" or "corpo-
rate entity interests" or "multi-constituency interests" on the one hand,
and interests that may be characterized as "shareholder short term in-
terests" or "current share value interests" on the other?
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Some commentators have argued that a corporation has an "in-
dependent interest in its own long-term business success."10 5
Until Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, however, the Delaware judici-
ary had not directly endorsed directors' consideration of non-
shareholder constituencies.' 0 6 Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, in which the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
that Paramount's offer was a threat to the corporation rather
than its shareholders, also vigorously endorsed the stakeholder
approach.' 0 7
One of the strongest recent trends in corporate governance
has been the growing insistence that directors recognize stake-
holder interests. Indeed, the stakeholder model is the only
model that states have enacted into law. No fewer than twenty-
nine states have legislated that directors may consider stake-
holder interests in arriving at business judgments.'0 8 Termed
"stakeholder constituency statutes," most of these statutes ex-
plicitly empower directors to consider stakeholder interests in
conjunction with shareholder interests. 10 9 Minnesota's stake-
holder statute, a typical one, states that directors "may, in con-
sidering the best interests of the corporation, consider the
interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers,
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., (1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,178 n.5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). "[D]irectors... may
find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are expected to pro-
mote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share
value can be expected to be negatively affected." Id. at 92,178; see Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (finding that
time frame is a relevant factor in responding to a takeover).
105. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 202.
The greater the amount of goods or services the enterprise can sell, and
the greater the difference between what the consumer is willing to pay
and what the goods or services cost to produce, the greater the profit
that inures to the enterprise. Viewed in this light, the corporate enter-
prise has an independent interest of its own in the successful operation
of its business, with success measured in terms of present and ex-
pected profit.
Id. at 203.
106. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). A director may consider "the impact [of a
takeover] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)...." Id. at 955.
By allowing the target board to consider a takeover's "impact on constituen-
cies other than shareholders," Unocal illustrates the degree to which the busi-
ness judgment rule may be wielded to expand the already broad scope of
director's discretion to bypass shareholder input. The business judgment rule
in the takeover context thus may allow advancement of stakeholder interests at
the expense of shareholder interests.
107. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
108. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1352 n.177.
109. See id.
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and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community
and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-
term interests of the corporation and its shareholders... ."11o In
contrast to the traditional view of the corporation based on the
economic perspective of the corporate entity as an aggregation of
shareholder interests for the purpose of maximizing wealth, the
stakeholder model exhorts much broader objectives. Under the
stakeholder model, shareholders are but one constituency of the
corporation; employees, consumers, suppliers, and the general
public are also sufficiently affected by a corporation's activities
to warrant consideration.
Allowing boards to equate or even subordinate sharehold-
ers' interests to stakeholders' interests runs counter to a long-
standing, fundamental principle of corporate management: the
principle that the directors' duty is to maximize shareholder
wealth. Minnesota law, for example, says that a director's stan-
dard of conduct encompasses the duty to "discharge the duties of
the position of director in good faith, in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation... ."-111
The pivotal question is how directors can satisfy stake-
holder constituencies consistent with their fiduciary duty to
shareholders. 112 Some argue that, if directors focus primarily
110. Mim. STAT. § 302A.251, subd.5 (1992).
111. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd.1 (1992).
112. Until a takeover becomes imminent, directors may consider non-
shareholder constituencies in deploying takeover defenses as long as they also
benefit the shareholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986). Revlon provides guidance about the directors'
responsibility to the shareholders once a takeover becomes inevitable; prior to
this threshold, directors must serve conflicting constituencies. See id. at 182
(describing how a board may consider nonshareholder constituencies "provided
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.... However,
such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction
among active bidders is in progress [such that the sole duty is] to sell to the
highest bidder." (citation omitted)); see also TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,173
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("When a corporation is in a 'Revlon mode,' legitimate
concerns relating to the claims of other constituencies are absent and, indeed,
concerns about the corporation as a distinct entity become attenuated."); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989) (hold-
ing that a board may consider "the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable rela-
tionship to general shareholder interests. . . .") See generally ABA Comm. on
Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential For Confusion, 45
Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990) [hereinafter Other Constituencies] (concluding that the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act should not be amended to allow direc-
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on shareholders' best interests, shareholders and stakeholders
simultaneously benefit. 113 Accordingly, many issues emerge
from a stakeholder model in which directors are allowed to con-
sider stakeholder interests. 114 First, because a corporation
would only harm itself by discarding valuable employees or sup-
pliers, 115 only suboptimal employees, suppliers, or creditors
would be affected by a "shareholder primacy" approach.116 Be-
cause most nonshareholders are already protected by other
laws, 117 stakeholder problems resulting from board action stem-
ming from a shareholder primacy perspective are short-term. 118
In addition, requiring accountability to holders of conflicting
interests may ultimately harm both groups." 9 Managers free to
consider nonshareholder interests would be less accountable to
shareholders. 120 Just as there is no gauge by which courts can
tors to take into account the interests of persons or groups other than share-
holders in performing their duties).
113. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 60, at 1190-92.; ef Other Con-
stituencies, supra note 112, at 2269 (suggesting that a better interpretation of
directors' duties, statutes, and related case law allows directors to take into
account nonshareholder constituencies, but only "to the extent that directors
are acting in the best interests, long as well as short term, of the shareholders
and the corporation").
114. For a recent analysis of directors' duty legislation, see Other Constitu-
encies, supra note 112, at 2263-71.
115. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 60, at 1170-71.
116. See id.
117. See Other Constituencies, supra note 112, at 2268 (discussing how cred-
itors, management, employees, and unions have other means of protection);
Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 865, 884 (1987) (asserting that em-
ployees are protected by labor laws and suppliers are protected by bankruptcy,
antitrust, and contract laws). "Legislation governing hostile takeovers should
not attempt to minimize noninvestors' risks at the expense of our free market
system." Id. (footnote omitted).
118. For example, employees or suppliers are usually only temporarily dis-
placed; that is, many constituencies have the capacity to find a replacement for
their reliance on the target.
119. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 60, at 1192; see also Andre,
supra note 117, at 884 ("[Mlanagement should not be asked or allowed to at-
tempt to carry out the impossible task of acting as fiduciaries for groups with
competing interests."); Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom? 25 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 121, 126 (1990).
120. In the narrowest sense, when managers are free to consider non-
shareholder interests in takeover scenarios rather than focus on the sole objec-
tive of maximizing shareholder wealth, their "accountability" is diminished
inasmuch as shareholders can less easily monitor managers' performance. See
generally Johnson, supra note 4, at 881-84 (describing this tenet and its
difficulties).
Former SEC chairman Davis S. Ruder argued that director accountability
to a clearly defined group (i.e., shareholders) is a cornerstone of the corporate
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assess whether a director breaches his duty to stakeholders, the
"standard" by which courts define a director's duty to sharehold-
ers likely also defies containment. 121 The undefined parameters
of this "standard" fuel directors' uncertainty regarding their al-
legiance to shareholders. 122
This debate, however, presumes incompatibility of share-
holder and stakeholder interests. Certainly those interests con-
flicted during the takeover frenzy of the 1980s, but today's
economy and global markets present a new focus and a new
challenge. The focus is on economic success in a global economy.
The challenge for a corporation is to operate at peak efficiency in
all respects, including relations among the corporate triad. The
board must seek to highlight that focus, to meet the challenge
and enhance economic efficiency by facilitating communication
within and among management, the shareholders, and the
stakeholders.
system: "If management duties to others are declared, the process of corporate
accountability will be thrown into disarray." David S. Ruder, Speech to the
American Bar Association committee responsible for the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act (Aug. 6, 1990), quoted in ABA Model Act Panel Rejects
Other-Constituencies Measures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, 1217
(Aug. 17, 1990).
121. Directors' duty legislation affords no guidance as to how directors
should consider nonshareholder constituencies. See Dennis J. Block & Yvette
Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover
Contests, 11 SEe. REG. L. J. 44, 69 (1983); Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at
1538-45.
122. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of
the American Bar Association has concluded:
[Plermitting-much less requiring-directors to consider [stakeholder]
interests without relating such consideration in an appropriate fashion
to shareholder welfare (as the Delaware courts have done) would con-
flict with directors' responsibility to shareholders and could undermine
the effectiveness of the system that has made the corporation an effi-
cient device for the creation of jobs and wealth.
Other Constituencies, supra note 112, at 2268.
The Committee believes that the better approach is to allow directors to
take the interests of other constituencies into account, "but only as and to the
extent that the directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as short
term, of the shareholders and the corporation." Id. at 2269.
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with [stakeholder] stat-
utes, if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of vari-
ous constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests,
would be profoundly troubling ... When directors must not only de-
cide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their duty
of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can be
expected.
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III. THE INEVITABILITY OF A "CORPORATE
COOPERATION" REGIME
The current corporate governance framework ill-serves
modern corporate activity and, if left unchanged, will markedly
undermine the United States' international competitiveness.
This section describes recent advances in corporate law intended
to give shareholders a greater voice in corporate governance.
These advances are but a small portion of the total reform initia-
tive needed to cure corporate law's current ills. What is really
needed is a new legal paradigm: the "corporate cooperation"
paradigm.
A. "COOPERATE COOPERATION" AND RECENT ADVANCES IN
PROXY REGULATION
Many believe that recent advances in the proxy regulations
of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) greatly en-
hance the shareholder's position in corporate governance. The
SEC found that its old proxy and disclosure rules impeded
shareholder communication and participation in the corporate
governance process:
This demonstrated effect of the current rules is contrary to Congress's
intent that the rules assure fair, and effective shareholder suffrage.
Apart from attempts to obtain proxy voting authority, to the degree the
current rules inhibit the ability of shareholders not seeking proxy au-
thority to analyze and discuss issues pertaining to the operation of a
company and its performance, these rules may in fact run exactly con-
trary to the best interests of shareholders. 1 2
3
One commentator claims that "[bly changing proxy solicitation
rules ... the [SEC] ushered in a new era of shareholder activ-
ism. .. -124 Another commentator notes:
The [SEC]'s new proxy... rules herald a new era of corporate govern-
ance. Shareholders now have greater access to proxy statements.
They can nominate dissident board candidates along with the selected
management nominees. They can vote on individual proxy proposals.
And they can communicate among themselves without first filing with
the SEC. In short, shareholders now have a greatly enhanced opportu-
nity to involve themselves in company operations. 1
2 5
123. See Rule 14-6, Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
124. Frederick E. Rowe, Jr., Hurrah for October 15, FORBEs, Feb. 15, 1993,
at 234, 234.
125. Louis M Thompson, Jr., Shareholder Relations: A New Role for the
Board, HARv. Bus. REv. Jan/Feb 1993, at 81, 81.
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On October 16, 1992, the SEC promulgated its final rules on
shareholder communications ("SEC's 1992 Final Rules"), 126
which consummate the SEC's extensive three-year examination
of the effectiveness of the proxy-voting process and its impact on
the corporate governance system.127 These amendments intro-
duce changes that facilitate shareholder participation.
The SEC's 1992 Final Rules amended the definition of "so-
licitation" to specify that a shareholder can publicly announce
how it intends to vote and provide reasons for that decision with-
out having to comply with the proxy rules. 128 This safe harbor
excludes from the definition of "solicitation" announcements
that are published, broadcast, or disseminated to the media.129
The safe harbor may also exclude some methods of communicat-
ing voting decisions not explicitly identified in the rules.130
126. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276 (1992) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
127. Id. at 48277.
128. Id.
129. Under the amended federal proxy rules, the following communications
do not constitute "solicitations":
1. The furnishing of a form of proxy in response to a shareholder's unsolic-
ited request;
2. The company's provision of a shareholder list to another soliciting
party or the mailing of such other party's soliciting material to share-
holders, if required by the federal proxy rules;
3. The performance of ministerial acts on behalf of a person soliciting a
proxy; or
4. A shareholder's statement of how the shareholder intends to vote on
one or more matters at a shareholders' meeting and the shareholder's
reasons for doing so. In order for such a shareholder statement not to
constitute a solicitation, however, it must be made by a shareholder
who is not otherwise engaged in a proxy solicitation requiring the con-
current or subsequent filing of a proxy statement under the federal
proxy rules. It also must be:
a. made by means of speeches in public forums, press releases or pub-
lished or broadcast opinions, statements or advertisements ap-
pearing in a broadcast medium or a bona fide publication
(including a newspaper or periodical) disseminated on a regular
basis;
b. directed to persons to whom the shareholder owes a fiduciary duty
in connection with the voting of securities held by the shareholder;
or
c. made in response to unsolicited requests for additional information
with respect to a prior communication by the shareholder made
under this exclusion.
Rule 14a-1(1)2(i-iv), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(/)2(i-iv) (1993).
130. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
57 Fed. Reg. 48282.
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In addition, the SEC's 1992 Final Rules' 31 amended Rule
14a-2(b) 132 to create an exemption from the proxy statement de-
livery and disclosure requirements for communications with
shareholders; this exemption applies when the person soliciting
is not seeking proxy authority, does not have a substantial inter-
est in the matter subject to vote, and is not otherwise ineligible
for the exemption. 13 3 The rationale for the amendment is that
the current rules unnecessarily curtail shareholder communica-
tions on matters related to the company and its management by
creating "a chilling effect on discussion of management perform-
ance, out of fear that the communication could after the fact be
found to have triggered disclosure and filing obligations under
the federal proxy rules. " 13 4 As the SEC has noted:
[Ain essential problem in this area is that it is generally not possible
for a shareholder to know with certainty that a communication will or
will not be deemed to constitute a solicitation. The broad definition of
a proxy solicitation that includes not only a request for a proxy or re-
quest to execute, not execute or revoke a proxy, but also the furnishing
of... a communication to security holders under circumstances rea-
sonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revoca-
tion of a proxy, creates this inherent uncertainty for shareholders. As
a result of this definition, almost any statement of views could be al-
leged to be a solicitation, and the shareholder could be exposed to
litigation .... 135
The old proxy rules "thus unduly hindered free discussion that
could better inform shareholders as to their voting decisions." 13 6
The Rule 14a-2(b)(1) exemption "generally is available to
any person, whether or not a shareholder, who conducts a solici-
tation but does not seek proxy voting authority or furnish share-
holders with a form of consent, authorization, abstention, or
revocation, and does not act on behalf of any such person."137
The rule sets forth ten categories of persons who are ineligible to
rely on the exemption, including the registrant and its affiliates,
associates, officers or directors; any nominees for whose election
131. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276 (1992) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
132. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-2(b) (1993).
133. See Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Sharehold-
ers, 57 Fed. Reg. 48279-80. Public notice of written soliciting activity will be
required by beneficial owners of more than five million dollars of the regis-
trant's securities through publication, broadcast, or submission to the Commis-
sion of the written soliciting materials. Id.
134. Id. at 48279.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 48280 (footnote omitted).
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as a director proxies are solicited; any person soliciting in oppo-
sition to extraordinary transactions such as mergers;138 any per-
son required to report beneficial ownership of the registrant's
equity securities on Schedule 13D;13 9 any person who receives
compensation (other than reimbursement pursuant to the share-
holder communications rules) directly related to the solicitation
of proxies from an ineligible person; any registrant that is an
investment company; and any person who, because of a substan-
tial interest in the subject matter of the solicitation, is likely to
receive a benefit from a successful solicitation that will not be
shared pro rata by all shareholders. 140 In addition, notice re-
quirements are imposed on "all written solicitations conducted
by a person who has beneficial ownership of more than $5 mil-
lion of the securities that are subject to the solicitation other
than speeches in a public forum, press releases, and published
or broadcast opinions, statements or advertisements." 14 '
The SEC's 1992 Final Rules minimized preclearance re-
quirements in two ways. First, amendments to Rules 14a-
3(a)' 42 and 14a-4143 allow registrants and other soliciting par-
ties to commence a solicitation on the basis of a preliminary
proxy statement publicly filed with the SEC.'4 In addition,
amendments to Rule 14a-6' 45 allow solicitation materials other
than the proxy statement and form of proxy to be filed with the
SEC in definitive form at the time of dissemination. 146 The
amendments retain the preliminary filing requirements of Rule
14a-6(a) relating to written proxy statements and forms of
proxy. 14 7
138. Id. at 48280-81. Recapitalizations, reorganizations, sales of assets, and
other extraordinary transactions are also included. Id. at 48281.
139. Id. This applies unless the person has filed a Schedule 13D and has not
disclosed an intent, or reserved the right, to engage in a control transaction, or
a contested solicitation for the election of directors. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 48280.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a).
143. Id. § 240.14a-4.
144. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
57 Fed. Reg. 48283. No form of proxy, however, can be provided to the solicited
shareholders until a definitive proxy statement is disseminated. Id.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6.
146. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
57 Fed. Reg. 48283. In addition, preliminary proxy statements are now avail-
able for public inspection when filed except in connection with business combi-
nations other than roll-ups and going-private transactions. Id.
147. Id. at 48283.
1994] 1473
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1443
The SEC's 1992 Final Rules amended Rule 14a-7 to require
registrants, in the case of transactions subject to the SEC's roll-
up or going-private rules, to provide shareholders, on written re-
quest and satisfaction of certain conditions, copies of its list of
shareholder names, addresses, and position listing, as well as
any list of non-objecting or consenting beneficial owners if in
possession of the registrant;148 in all other cases, registrants
must make an election either to provide a list to, or mail materi-
als for, the requesting shareholders. 149 If management proposes
to solicit proxies, Rules 14a-7 (a) and (b) may require it to assist
any shareholder to communicate with other shareholders. At
the written request of an insurgent, management may either
provide a shareholder list that complies with Rule 14a-7(c), 150 or
mail to shareholders the insurgents' material at the insurgents'
expense.' 51 The amended Rule 14a-7 provides that registrants
148. Id. at 48285.
149. The salient provisions of the SEC's 1992 Final Rules amending Rule
14a-7 include sections addressing a registrant's obligation and shareholders'
certification:
Regarding a registranfs obligation, the revised rule requires registrants to
deliver, within five business days after receipt of a shareholder request, a list or
statement including the following information: notification that the registrant
elects to mail the shareholder's soliciting materials; the approximate number of
record holders and beneficial holders (separated by type and class) owning se-
curities in the same class of holders solicited by management or any more lim-
ited group of such holders designated by the shareholder; and the estimated
cost of mailing a proxy statement, form of proxy or other communication to such
holders. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7(a)(1)(i-iii). The information must be reason-
ably current and must include a list of beneficial owners obtained by the regis-
trant (the NOBO/COBO list). Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(ii).
Addressing shareholders' certification, the revised rule permits beneficial
owners to request a shareholder list as long as adequate documentation of bene-
ficial ownership is provided with the initial request. Shareholders receiving a
list under revised Rule 14a-7 must provide the registrant with a certification
identifying the proposal that will be the subject of the shareholder's solicitation
or communication and attesting that the shareholder will not: (a) use the list
information for any purpose other than to communicate with or solicit security
holders regarding the same meeting or action by consent or authorization for
which the registrant is soliciting proxies; nor (b) disclose the list information to
any person other than a beneficial owner for whom the list request was made,
or an employee or agent to the extent necessary to effect the communication or
solicitation. Id. §§ 240.14a-7(c)(i-ii).
150. Rule 14a-7(c) requires the list to indicate the names and addresses of
shareholders of the company, but it does not require the company to divulge the
number of shares owned by each shareholder. Id. § 240.14a-7(c) (1993).
151. Id. § 240.14a-7(c) (1993). This choice, however, is not available to man-
agement if the insurgents lawfully obtain the shareholder list on their own and
make no request of management. First Surety Corp. v. Community Bank, 337
F. Supp. 667, 670 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Thus, management has no control over an
insurgent's solicitations absent a written request for assistance.
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retain the option to deliver the shareholder list or to mail solicit-
ing materials on behalf of the soliciting shareholder. 5 2
B. "CoRpoRATE COOPERATION" AND SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY
COMMITrEES
Reformers have also tried to use means other than proxy
regulation to create opportunities for involvement in corporate
governance. For institutional investors "to comply with their
own fiduciary duties to invest prudently, [they] must have the
information necessary to evaluate the performance of the direc-
tors to whom they have delegated managerial responsibility." 53
Shareholders currently seek to use the shareholder advisory
committee as a mechanism by which to formally or informally
discuss governance issues. 54
Shareholder advisory committees are not a new concept:
The idea [behind shareholder advisory committees] has considerable
historical precedent. In earlier eras, free of regulations that deter the
formation of outside shareholder groups .. ., shareholder committees
were a relatively widespread phenomenon at public corporations.
They were typically organized informally when corporate performance
or board behavior was suspect, and convened to oversee and question
the board. The current crop of shareholder committees propose a mod-
em-day equivalent that is formal and internal to the corporation due to
the deterrents that the regulations place on outside committees and
groups. 15
5
The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)
proposed establishing such a committee to Avon Products, Inc.;
Texaco, Inc.; and Sears, Roebuck & C0.156 Howard Sherman of
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., views CalPERS' cur-
rent proposals to establish shareholder advisory committees as
"the most important shareholder initiative attempting to influ-
152. Specifically, the registrant must provide a requesting shareholder with
a list of holders of securities of a class from which proxies have been solicited or
are to be solicited on management's behalf in connection with a shareholder
meeting or action by consent or authorization; or mail the requesting share-
holder's soliciting materials to shareholders or subgroups of shareholders of
that class. Amendments to Regulation of Communications Among Sharehold-
ers, 57 Fed. Reg. 48286.
153. See David G. Ball, The Inevitability of Getting Involved, DmzcToas &
BoARUs, Winter 1991, at 56, 56; Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 30.
154. The Securities and Exchange Commission has consistently ruled that
shareholder advisory committees are proper subjects for shareholder proposals.
See, e.g., TRW, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 1990 WL 286008 (S.E.C.).
155. Institutional Voting Research Service Client Advisory Letter (May
1990), in INSTITUTIONAL INvEsToRs, supra note 42, at 24.
156. See Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 30.
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ence shareholder-board relations."15 7 In a proxy contest be-
tween Harold Simmons and Lockheed Corp., Simmons promised
to promote the creation of a shareholder advisory committee if
his slate of director nominees was elected.158 In 1989, Travis
Reed, Jr., proposed that First Executive Corporation's board es-
tablish a seven member shareholder advisory committee.159
Shareholder bankruptcy committees permitted under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code160 serve as one possible model for
corporate shareholder advisory committees. 161 As in the bank-
ruptcy setting, directors' conflicts of interest 62 and responsibil-
157. Howard D. Sherman, Special Report: The 1990 Proxy Season (Institu-
tional Shareholder Serv., Inc., Aug. 10, 1990), in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
supra note 42, at 306.
158. See Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 30.
159. First Executive Proxy Statement, at 11-12 (May 1, 1989) (WESTLAW,
SEC-ONLINE file).
160. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
161. Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
(a)(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the ap-
pointment of additional committees ... of equity security holders if
necessary to assure [their] adequate representation....
(b)(2) A committee of equity security holders appointed under subsec-
tion (a)(2) of this section shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing
to serve, that hold the seven largest amounts of equity securities of the
debtor of the kinds represented on such committee.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), (b)(2) (1988).
Shareholder bankruptcy committees thus are one possible paradigm for
shareholder advisory committees outside of the Chapter 11 context. Under
Chapter 11, these committees exhibit three key characteristics. First they are
given the duty and power to represent the equity security holders and may do
as follows:
[C]onsult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the ad-
ministration of the case; investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabili-
ties, and financial condition of the debtor . . . ; participate in the
formulation of [reorganization] plan[s] ... ; request the appointment of
a trustee or examiner... ; [and] perform such other services as are in
the interest of the equity security holders.
Id. §§ 1103(c)(1-5). They also have the power "with the court's approval... [to]
select and authorize the employment [of] one or more attorneys, accountants, or
other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee[s]." Id.
§ 1103(a). In addition, shareholder bankruptcy committees have a fiduciary
duty to represent the interests of the other shareholders. In re Beker Indus., 55
B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). Finally, incumbent directors generally
may not serve on these committees because of potential conflicts of interest. In
re Penn-Dixie Indus., 9 B.R. 941, 944-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Realty
Assoc. Securities Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 156 F.2d
480 (2d Cir. 1946).
162. "When a corporation enters into a Chapter 11 reorganization, the board
of directors faces a conflict among its duties and loyalties to its shareholders,
officers, employees, creditors, and the court." Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J.
445, 493 (1991).
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ity to multiple constituencies may prevent the director from
adequately recognizing and representing shareholder interests,
for example, with hostile takeover bids and derivative suits filed
against officers or directors. 163
Because shareholder advisory committees are an untested,
evolving concept, they have no definitive composition.' 64 As
CalPERS proposed to Avon, for example, a shareholder advisory
committee would consist of at least nine members.' 65 The board
would retain discretion to establish procedures for selecting
members willing to serve, provided the board structure satisfies
three criteria: each member is a beneficial owner of at least
1,000 shares of common voting stock for the entire period of
membership; no member has any affiliation with the corporation
other than as a shareholder; and at least five members are se-
lected from the fifty largest beneficial owners of the corpora-
tion's voting shares. 166 CalPERS further urged that each
membership term be limited to one year, that no member be eli-
gible to serve more than three consecutive terms, and that the
committee be limited to providing nonbinding, advisory counsel
to the company's board.167 Finally, CalPERS proposed that
Avon's shareholder advisory committee, if created, provide ad-
vice to the board "regarding the interests of shareholders on
principal policy considerations relevant to the company and its
business, such as major restructuring or acquisitions, mergers,
compensation issues, and other matters on which the board may
choose to consult the committee." 68 Structured as CalPERS
proposed, shareholder advisory committees would serve as a re-
source to the board and enhance relationships between a corpo-
ration and its largest providers of capital.169
Shareholder advisory committees are designed to overcome
the free-rider problem, a classic problem in shareholder govern-
ance participation. The free-rider problem is one of incentives.
No individual shareholder has the incentive to take action that
will benefit shareholders as a class because each shareholder
163. See id. at 494. In these circumstances, "directors may be ill-suited to
represent the interests of shareholders." Id. (citation omitted).
164. See Koppes & Gillan, supra note 90, at 30-31 (describing the composi-
tion of a shareholder advisory committee as proposed by CalPERS to Avon).
165. Id. at 31.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 31-32.
169. Id. at 32.
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knows that its efforts will be enjoyed by all. Rather, sharehold-
ers have an incentive to take no action and enjoy a free ride.170
The shareholder advisory committee may provide an effi-
cient mechanism for large shareholders to be involved in the
governance process. 171 The extent of the benefit from this form
of monitoring, however, depends on the role and function of the
committee. For example, the benefits to a shareholder from a
purely advisory committee, although potentially substantial,
would likely be less than those of a mandatory committee.' 7 2 In
addition, with mandatory committees, the costs of organizing,
monitoring, and influencing management would correspond-
ingly decrease because many costs would be reimbursed and be-
cause the costs of small, officially recognized committees should
be lower than the comparable costs for large or ad hoc groups,
such as those formed for a particular issue.' 73
For all the potential that shareholder advisory committees
may hold, their creation in all but the most extreme circum-
stances is unlikely. As in the bankruptcy context, significant
problems typically must arise in the operation of the corporation
before attention from institutional shareholders will be suffi-
ciently intense to force changes in the system. Absent such ex-
treme problems, there is little likelihood that institutional
shareholders will focus their energies on creation of shareholder
advisory committees at any particular corporation.
170. See Rock, supra note 162, at 456 (describing the classic collective action
dilemma as follows: "while it is better for all if each contributes, it is better for
each not to contribute, with the result that discipline, while in the collective
interest of the shareholders, is not provided." (footnote omitted)).
171. The potential benefits of providing discipline increase while the corre-
sponding costs decrease. Id. at 460.
172. Id. at 495
If certain key decisions, such as whether the corporation should be sold
or whether or not to pursue a derivative suit, were delegated to the
committee, the committee would be likely to have a significant impact.
If the committee were purely advisory, the increase.., could still be
substantial, because once the committee was in place, the managers of
a concentrated corporation could only ignore the institutional share-
holders' collective, organized advice at their peril.
Id.
173. Id. at 495. To the extent major shareholders are repeat players, "the
likelihood is low that free riding will significantly undermine the shareholders'
committees." Id. at 496.
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C. THE POTENTIAL OF "RELATIONAL INVESTING"
According to Columbia's Louis Lowenstein and other ex-
perts,174 the solution to America's corporate governance di-
lemma resides in a concept labeled "relational investing."175 In
relational investing, institutional investors make very large,
long-term investments in a few companies while maintaining
close ties with the companies' top management. 176 According to
Lowenstein, relational investing will allow shareholders to real-
ize their gains in the growing stream of income produced by the
businesses in which they invest.' 77
Other commentators doubt the viability of relational invest-
ing for several reasons. First, fiduciary duties and other legal
constraints effectively prevent pension managers from locking
up their beneficiaries' funds for long periods.' 78 In addition,
conflict of interest problems may arise when a fund establishes a
"special relationship" with corporate management that is not
available to other shareholders.' 7 9 Finally, very few pension
fund managers have the ability and incentive to emulate the
likes of Warren Buffet.180
These criticisms, however, miss the point by emphasizing
unusual situations. Stakeholders and shareholders, together
with management, usually fare best when there is active com-
munication and a focus on the economic well-being of the busi-
ness. To accentuate aberrational situations is to ignore the
opportunity created by enhanced communication and an altered
role for the board of directors. If relational investing helps insti-
tutional investors focus on better communication and long-term
results, the corporate cooperation regime will benefit.
174. See generally Joel Chernoff & Marlene Givant Star, Three Studies Sup-
port Relationship Investing, PENSIONS & INvEsTMENTS, Jan. 11, 1993 at 3, 30.
175. See Louis Lowenstein, Dear Mr. Clinton. How to Repair the Market,
BARRoN's, Feb. 8, 1993, at 20, 22 (recommending changes in tax and accounting
rules to encourage relational investing).
176. See generally Cordtz, supra note 8, at 28 ("Stripped of its qualifiers,
[relational investing] means that institutional investors should all be Warren
Buffets.").
177. Lowenstein, supra note 175, at 22.
178. Cordtz, supra note 8, at 28.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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IV. "CORPORATE COOPERATION" AS THE NEW
CORPORATE LAW REGIME
Boards traditionally have not facilitated communication
among the corporate constituencies. They have not sought to
mediate between the interests of shareholders and nonshare-
holders by resolving conflicts or advancing mutual interests.
Boards have lacked incentive to seek shareholder input. No
legal framework exists to balance the often opposing interests of
shareholders and nonshareholders. The current board approach
is designed for a bygone era.
The proposition that reform must ultimately focus on the
board is consistent with the economic rationale for a board-cen-
tered governance system. Board-centered reform must ulti-
mately mesh with the current "agency-cost" model on which
most corporate codes are based. The monitoring resulting from
directors' fiduciary duties forms the basis of contemporary cor-
porate law and governance.
A. TiE PROPOSED "CORPORATE CooPERATIoN" REGIME
Ultimately reform must confront the ascendancy and grow-
ing expertise of longterm shareholders, especially sophisticated
institutional investors. These institutional investors will not
tolerate entrenched management and unresponsive boards. Ac-
cordingly, reform proposals must simultaneously recognize the
preeminent status of the board, the need for input from major
institutional shareholders, and the need to supplement share-
holder input with that of stakeholders. Reform must boost mon-
itoring effectiveness by increasing the trialogue among the three
key players.
The board-as-mediator proposal most closely addresses the
twin goals of strengthening the board and harnessing the exper-
tise of contemporary institutional investors and stakeholders.
Ideally, the board would serve as a central nervous system link-
ing longterm shareholders and longterm stakeholders. This pro-
posal contemplates three primary board functions: a
management function, in which the board actively makes corpo-
rate policy; a monitoring function, in which it keeps tabs on is-
sues and areas it does not actively manage; and a new,
relationship management function, in which it aggressively cre-
ates a communication trialogue with shareholders and stake-
holders. The only way to strengthen the board is to enhance the
focus on the third function. The proposal thus envisions a corpo-
rate governance framework that reconfigures the relationship
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between the three key players-the board of directors, longterm
shareholders, and longterm stakeholders-in a way that enables
them to engage in trialogue toward maximizing the long-term
profitability of the corporate enterprise.
Obviously, such a board structure requires directors of the
highest caliber. Accordingly, boards should be infused with
what Gilson and Kraakman call "professional directors." Fur-
thermore, consistent with the longterm shareholder focus, board
members should strive to become "long-term directors." 18 The
board would thus be populated by "long-term professional direc-
tors." These "professional directors" could serve a long-term ten-
ure of perhaps five years in carrying out their function as
mediators between longterm shareholders and longterm stake-
holders. Structured this way, corporate governance would maxi-
mize both the long-term profitability of a corporation and the
long-term economic efficiency of the nation.' 8 2
To increase the trialogue function of the board, a corpora-
tion should take the following three actions: create a new board
committee, the "relationship management committee," designed
to bring about a corporate trialogue; urge longterm shareholders
and stakeholders to invent and experiment with new mecha-
nisms for informing directors; and explicitly commit themselves
to maximizing long-term corporate value by enhancing corporate
communications.
B. ADVANTAGES OF A "CORPORATE COOPERATION" REGIME
1. Enhanced Monitoring and Accountability
The more the law grants stakeholders and longterm share-
holders a voice regarding matters in which management's inter-
est may diverge from stakeholders' and society's interests, the
more likely that management will be accountable to those with
vested corporate interests. Monitoring requires significant ef-
fort. Only those stakeholders with incentives to monitor will un-
dertake the task. By focusing on relationship management, the
proposed framework takes advantage of the incentives for
longterm shareholders to monitor the aspects of corporate gov-
181. Perhaps even Martin Lipton would sanction this. See Lipton & Rosen-
blum, supra note 4, at 225-28.
182. Yet the Matheson/Olson proposal does not go far enough because its
primary focus is upon corporate law. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6. In-
deed, the authors propose an entirely new code of statutory corporate law. Id.
It is necessary to augment their framework with the specific means by which
directors can fulfill their new function.
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ernance relevant to each of their shareholdings. As a result, cor-
porations will have a mechanism to minimize conflict situations
while holding management accountable to major longterm
stakeholders.
2. Enhanced Board Decision Making
The board structure that best lends itself to reasoned, in-
dependent, thoughtful decision making is not one in which much
effort is spent erecting roadblocks to shareholder input and
maintaining the status quo, including routine approval of man-
agement actions. Rather it is a board structure in which
longterm shareholders and longterm stakeholders challenge, ex-
pand on, and inform managerial discretion. By soliciting the in-
put of major stakeholders, including longterm shareholders, in
appropriate fundamental transactions, directors will make bet-
ter reasoned decisions.
Directors seeking to balance the needs of shareholders and
nonshareholders will face a quagmire of uncertainty unless they
actively seek and encourage shareholder input for fundamental
decisions that influence the corporate governance regime. "By
failing to encourage shareholder input, the current legal land-
scape effectively discourages directors from mitigating their un-
certainty; it discourages directors from seeking shareholder
guidance."18 3
3. Enhanced Economic Efficiency
To maximize economic efficiency, corporate decisions re-
quire an optimal blend of incentives, information, discretion,
and oversight. Incentives, however, are the key. Constituencies
motivated by adequate incentives will find ways to increase the
amount of information, discretion, and oversight at their
disposal.
Most decisions are best left to managers. Only managers
have the incentives and information to perform and oversee
daily operations. Other stakeholders lack such incentives and
information and cannot therefore participate effectively in this
operational domain. Easterbrook and Fischel argue, however,
that shareholders possess powerful incentives to monitor man-
agement and guide directors:
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the ap-
propriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. The firm
183. Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at 1491.
1482
CORPORATE COOPERATION
should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and costs
are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the sharehold-
ers, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the
income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security)
from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders receive most
of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They
therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion [or ensure
that it is exercised on their behalf]. 184
Easterbrook and Fischel further suggest that the shareholders'
position within the firm is unique because only shareholders
have a stake in every decision made by a corporation.18 5
There are two types of situations in which corporate cooper-
ation rather than simple management control is a sine qua non
for maximizing economic efficiency. The first is those funda-
mental corporate transactions that so influence longterm share-
holders' and stakeholders' financial interests that only long-
term shareholders and stakeholders possess the requisite incen-
tives to monitor the transactions' procedural and structural in-
tegrity. Procedural and structural transactions common to all
corporations are especially likely to fall in this category. In this
type of situation, shareholders can harness economies of scale in
monitoring and providing input,186 which allow them to over-
come their tendency toward passivity.18 7 Furthermore, share-
holders who monitor and provide input on the same type of
procedural or structural issue time after time develop even
greater incentive and ability to provide useful input. If share-
holders' input actually affects corporate performance, the incen-
tive for them to provide guidance increases even more. Thus,
whether an investor has monitoring skills today is irrelevant.
The issue is whether certain types of shareholders may have the
incentive to develop into effective monitors if given a more sym-
pathetic governance regime.
The second type of situation in which corporate cooperation
is essential involves transactions that are so fraught with con-
flicts of interest that no one decision maker can make an optimal
decision. In these situations, the central decision maker should
solicit input from those whose interests compete for supremacy.
184. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 403.
185. Id. at 404.
186. See, e.g., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 49, at 1352 (not-
ing that "because indexed investors hold shares in numerous companies, they
seem more able to exploit economies of scale in reaching voting decisions and
coordinating to oppose management").
187. See generally Black, supra note 4 (discussing that shareholders tend to
view their investments as passive).
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Here, a board must balance the input of managers, longterm
shareholders, and longterm stakeholders. This balancing of
competing interests will more likely lead to an optimally effi-
cient outcome consistent with the long-term objectives and ex-
pectations of all corporate stakeholders.
The focus on longterm shareholders maximizes and opti-
mizes economic efficiency in the long run. Harnessing share-
holder incentives to monitor and guide directors will lead to
systemic improvements in corporate governance. These im-
provements in the allocation of corporate governance powers
guarantee that society will benefit in the long term. This, in
turn, will pave the way for the United States to compete effec-
tively in the global marketplace.
4. Bridging Ownership and Control
Focusing on shareholder voice rather than shareholder con-
trol bridges rather than unites ownership and control. Although
liquidity remains intact, for shareholders to become stakehold-
ers, they must have a genuine stake in the underlying profitabil-
ity of the enterprise. Such a stake implies a long-term
commitment and thus forecloses unhampered liquidity.188
Bridging ownership and control also implies bridging the
conflicts of interests that inhere in the dichotomy between own-
ership and control. This minimizes conflicts of interest between
shareholders and managers. By soliciting and balancing the in-
put from other longterm stakeholders, the board is well-situated
to arrive at a decision that eliminates or minimizes the conflicts
of interest between shareholders and nonshareholders.
C. "CORPORATE COOPERATION" AND THE GoALs OF CORPORATE
LAw
A root problem of the current corporate legal landscape is
the uncertainty surrounding the proper purpose of the corporate
enterprise. All of corporate law doctrine ultimately must con-
front the question of the proper goal of corporate governance,
and no real reform can proceed without articulating precisely
what that goal should be. Since the inception of the corporation,
corporate governance has wrestled with the most fundamental
188. For a thoughtful discussion of the dichotomy between liquidity and con-
trol, see KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 49, at 1287 (concluding
that "those institutions that most desire liquidity would make poor monitors").
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question of corporate legitimacy and purpose: determining the
proper object of the corporation's allegiance.
Debate over the proper corporate objective and the propriety
of managers diverging from the goal of profit maximization has
raged without repose for more than half a century. By 1932,
Professors Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd debated the scope of
management's responsibility.'89 Professor Berle asserted that,
based on fiduciary duties owed shareholders, "powers granted to
a corporation ... are necessarily and at all times exercisable
only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders." 9 0 Professor
Dodd countered that public policy demands that corporations be
"an economic institution which has a social service as well as a
profit-making function."' 91 This debate demarcated the initial
boundaries between a fiduciary shareholder primacy norm and a
stakeholder approach. 192
Despite the importance of defining the goals of corporate
law, no corporate statute tries to do So. 1 9 3 Recent scholarship on
corporate governance demonstrates how governance goals elude
scholars.94 Perhaps the goal of corporate governance-that is,
maximizing corporate, and thus shareholder, value-has always
been so theoretically straight-forward that it has not needed ex-
plication.'9 5 At least this is the notion with which the law of
corporations and the principles of corporate governance began.
189. See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L.
REV. 1049 (1930-31); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
190. Berle, supra note 189, at 1049.
191. Dodd, supra note 189, at 1148.
192. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 521.
193. Id. at 523 ("Corporate statutes ... do not specify the purpose of the
corporation."); Johnson, supra note 4, at 874 ("[N]ot a single corporate statute
explicitly addresses the purpose of corporate activity."). Still, many business
corporation statutes and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act define
"corporation" as a corporation for profit. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. § 102(a)(4)
(1986).
194. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 187 ("In much of the recent
academic literature on corporate governance, ... the goals are either ill-defined
or assumed without examination.").
195. "Every business manager knows' what corporations are all about-cor-
porations make money from their products or services .... " Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 514; see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 877-78 ("Most persons in this
country probably would be astounded to hear that maximization of shareholder
wealth is the raison d'etre of corporate existence, yet the corporate doctrine
takes that focus for granted.").
Alternatively, perhaps legislators prefer to defer to scholars the resolution
of the knotty question of the meaning of corporate law. Although many possible
goals of corporate endeavor have emerged, maximizing shareholder profits
(with various exceptions, such as charitable donations) is the most established.
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Professor R. Edward Freeman articulates five generic enter-
prise level strategies that attempt to reconcile shareholders,
stakeholders, values, and social issues: a stockholder strategy,
which seeks to maximize benefits to stockholders and "financial
stakeholders"; 196 a narrow stakeholder strategy, which seeks to
maximize the benefits to one or a small set of stakeholders;197 a
utilitarian strategy, which seeks to maximize benefits to all
stakeholders-the greatest good for the greatest number-and
thus maximize the average welfare level for all stakeholders; 198
a Rawlsian strategy, which seeks to raise the level of the worst-
off stakeholder, consistent with Rawls' insistence on "a like lib-
erty for all"; 199 and a social harmony strategy, which seeks to
create social harmony by gaining consensus from society.200
Other goals of corporate law include maximizing long-term corporate welfare,
maximizing the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, various eco-
nomic goals, and various political goals (where the law should compel the corpo-
ration to pursue social goals which benefit society). See Schwartz, supra note 4,
at 525-26 (noting that the "political model is totally unworkable"); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance-Two Models of the
Corporation, 17 CR~iGHToN L. REv. 1, 2 (1983-84) (discussing "political model").
196. See R. EDwARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 103-04 (1984).
197. See id. at 102-03. For example, if "customer service" and "employee
welfare" are the basic values for a particular organization, and if the raison
d'etre of the firm is to achieve these values, then the firm has more or less
adopted what Freeman dubs a "specific stakeholder strategy." Id.
198. Id. at 104-05. Freeman's utilitarian rule reads as follows: "If the ac-
tions of a firm are perceived by its managers to have a wide range of effects on
stakeholders, and if the managers have utilitarian values .... then the firm will
adopt a utilitarian strategy to maximize the welfare of as many stakeholders as
possible." Id. at 105. Freeman suggests that AT&T's development and imple-
mentation of "universal service" as its guiding principle in part is due to
AT&T's acknowledging the social desirability of telephone service and so should
be made available to as many people as possible. Accordingly, AT&T's pricing
and service strategies flow from AT&T's overriding "utilitarian strategy." Id.
199. Id. at 105.
200. Id. at 106-07. Under such a strategy, the company derives its essential
identity from the community. Accordingly, when conflicts arise among stake-
holders, "major efforts are undertaken to resolve the conflict to the 'mutual un-
derstanding' of all parties." Id. at 106. Freeman's rule for implementing the
harmony strategy is as follows:
If the actions of a firm are perceived to have wide ranging effects on
society, and if the values of the managers are oriented towards commu-
nitarianism, i.e., an identification with the local community, and if so-
cial issues concern the promotion of community interest, then the firm
will adopt a harmony strategy. It will seek to minimize the amount of
friction between the firm and the local community, and to identify the
interests of the firm with the community.
Id. at 107.
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Each of these views misses the point, given the modern cor-
porate governance triad. The key to improving governance and
enhanced efficiency is improving communication. The corporate
board must be the impetus for the creation of relationships, not
merely contracts, with the other governance groups. The board
must actively seek to facilitate a multi-party communication
network.
D. THE CRITICAL NEED FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION
From Michael Porter's perspective, competitiveness today
depends on the capacity of the United States to upgrade its com-
petitive advantage to more competitive types.201 The competi-
tive position of several sectors of the U.S. economy, however,
appears to have declined relative to that of other nations. Ag-
gregate investment in property, plant and equipment, civilian
research and development, and intangible assets such as corpo-
rate training and related forms of corporate human resources
development is lower in the United States than in Japan and
Germany.202 Japanese rivals outinvest leading American firms
in many industries, including construction equipment, com-
puters, and tires.20 3
As Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard
Breeden has noted, "the most important objective.., for inves-
tors is good long-term economic performance. From the perspec-
tive of investors, there is no substitute for growth in the value of
a company."20 4 Breeden also notes that achieving sustained eco-
nomic growth in an intensely competitive national and interna-
tional economy depends heavily on a corporation's "ability to
pursue long-term strategic objectives ranging from fundamental
research and development to patient expansion of market
share."20 5 As one commentator stated: "The United States
economy and financial system suffer from 'short-termism,' an af-
fliction caused by a lack of attention to long-term economic per-
formance. Financial markets put pressure on corporate
201. MICHAEL E. PORTER, CAPITAL CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA
INVESTs IN INDusTRY 4 (1992).
202. Id. at 25.
203. Id.
204. Shareholder Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
120 (1991) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
205. Id.
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managers to focus too much on quarterly profits and too little on
patient investment for the loig haul."20 6
Ensuring that the board focuses on long-term corporate per-
formance requires that the board enlist the information, incen-
tives, and expertise of long-term constituents, shareholders and
nonshareholders alike. Nevertheless, shareholder rather than
nonshareholder guidance is the focal point for two reasons.
First, the pervasive conflicts of interest between shareholders
and stakeholders blur a board's ability to discern and serve the
best interests of shareholders. In addition, only asset owners
possess incentives to maximize the return on their investment.
Accordingly, because of these conflicts of interest and lack of in-
centives by the board to maximize shareholder welfare, directors
may benefit from shareholder guidance.
1. Minimizing Conflicts of Interest
Shareholder input may minimize conflicts of interest. As
the potential for conflicts of interest between shareholders, man-
agement, and stakeholders increase-with a corresponding in-
crease in the likelihood that management will ignore
shareholder concerns-the likelihood that directors' business
judgement will be skewed against longterm shareholder inter-
ests intensifies. At a minimum, a lack of shareholder input in
such conflicts of interest adds to the uncertainties directors face
in determining an optimal course for longterm shareholders. 20 7
Conflicts of interest among the corporate triad are espe-
cially serious in takeover scenarios.20 Economists tend to view
these situations from either a market efficiency position 20 9 or an
206. Cordtz, supra note 8, at 25.
207. See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 8 (1987).
ETihe inevitable uncertainties with respect to application of the busi-
ness judgment rule in particular situations .... ha[s] contributed to an
atmosphere of uncertainty [even as] directors ... act in good faith to
meet their responsibilities. [For example,] [s]uch uncertainty could
force directors to act defensively out of concern over costly personal
litigation rather than in directing and managing the business of the
corporation.
Id.
208. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at 1425.
209. According to the market efficiency theory, managers shield themselves
in anti-takeover devices without proper accountability to shareholders, usurp-
ing for themselves undue market power while ridding themselves of incentive
to run a more efficient corporation. Id. at 1493-94. Proponents of this view
argue that tender offers maximize outsiders' ability to monitor the target com-
pany's management performance. Id. Thus, takeovers maximize efficiency
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auction market position,21° both of which place shareholders in
preeminent status. Many economists suggest that directors er-
ecting anti-takeover armaments should objectively consider the
manifold alternatives for maximizing corporate profits and
should implement defensive measures only to limit inadequate
or coercive bids or to develop superior bids or restructuring
plans.211 Conflicts of interest also appear in many other corpo-
rate transactions, including executive compensation and dismis-
sal of shareholder derivative suits.
2. Maximizing Economic Efficiency
Shareholders' guidance may also promote economic effi-
ciency: "Only asset owners have the unfettered incentive to seek
out economically efficient alternatives."212 Directors, who lack
the incentives of asset owners and are saddled with conflicting
economically inefficient prejudices may fail to search for optimal
alternatives unless guided by shareholders. 213
Some scholars assert that corporate governance should
merely seek to facilitate the operation of the market and reduce
transaction costs. 2 14 This market model posits that the corpora-
tion merely substitutes for costly multiple contractual arrange-
ments to increase efficiency with the goal of maximizing
profits. 215 Supporters of the market model tend to ally them-
selves with proponents of the efficient capital market hypothe-
either by allowing suboptimal directors and managers to be taken over or by
motivating directors to run the corporation more efficiently-essentially, the
"market" monitors managerial performance while shareholders hold manage-
ment accountable for profit performance. Further, this enhanced efficiency
generates more wealth for both shareholders and non-shareholder constituen-
cies. Id. The theory's bottom line is that directors should remain "passive"
amid control change transactions. Id.
210. A more moderate approach focuses on the use of defensive anti-take-
over weaponry, such as a poison pill, in facilitating an auction market amid
hostile overtures. Id. at 1494-95. While the existence of an auction market will
generate greater premiums for shareholders, it is more significant that such a
market will maximize the likelihood of assuring the most productive match
among raider and target. Id. This optimal "match" maximizes long-term eco-
nomic efficiency. Id. Delaware courts have traditionally embraced the modified
"auction model" for corporate control. Id.
211. See id.
212. Matheson & Olson, supra note 38, at 1491.
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Fischel, The "Race of the Bottom", supra note 4, at 921; Fis-
chel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 4, at 1265; see also RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONoMc ANALYSIS OF LAw § 14.3, at 369 (3rd ed. 1986) (noting
that the primary purpose of corporate law is to provide standard terms).
215. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 523.
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sis. According to this hypothesis, even when a change of control
is not threatened, stock prices accurately reflect all available in-
formation about the corporation, including the extent of agency
costs arising from behavior that protects management.
216
In addition, proponents of the market monitoring model em-
phasize the invisible hand of the marketplace, which they be-
lieve compels managers to align their conduct with shareholders
lest the value of the corporate enterprise diminish.217 They
stress that the optimal governance structure must be derived
from experience rather than theory. Corporations that persuade
shareholders that they offer the highest return will garner the
largest investments. Thus, only firms and managers that make
choices investors would ordinarily prefer will prosper relative to
others.218
E. APPLYING THE "CORPORATE COOPERATION" REGIME
The leading corporate law case, Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,219 illustrates how a proactive corporate
cooperation regime may strengthen relations between board
members and stakeholders while maximizing longterm share-
holder and corporate value. The Delaware Supreme Court al-
lowed Time's board to redesign its proposed business
combination with Warner, thereby eliminating the need for tria-
logue with shareholders and stakeholders. 220 Specifically, Time
and Warner originally agreed on a stock-for-stock merger in
which the Time shareholders would receive roughly $125 per
share.221 But when Paramount entered the drama with a cash
bid for $175 (later raised to $200) per share, Time and Warner
revised their plan, making the transaction a tender offer instead
of a merger, thereby circumventing shareholder voting require-
ments and incurring an enormous debt burden of seven to ten
billion dollars.222
216. For a general overview of materials relevant to the efficient capital
market hypothesis, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 252-95
(2d ed. 1989). Chancellor Allen has questioned the infallibility of the efficient
market hypothesis. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989), affd, 565 A.2d 281 (Del. 1989).
217. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 56, at 1420.
219. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
220. Id. at 1154-55.
221. Id. at 1146.
222. Id. at 1147-49.
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Time-Warner avoided trialogue. Instead it forced on share-
holders and stakeholders a plan that was at least $50 to $75 per
share below the market's evaluation of the stock; restructured
the deal to preempt shareholder approval requirements while
incurring massive amounts of debt; refused to meet with Para-
mount to discuss its offer; and established a line of succession
for managing and directing the company, thereby eliminating a
fundamental function of future boards elected by the sharehold-
ers.223 Under a more amicable corporate cooperation regime,
longterm shareholders, longterm stakeholders and directors
would have communicated to best determine the fate of Time-
Warner. A corporate cooperation regime would have fostered a
fairer and more efficient outcome. Longterm shareholders and
longterm stakeholders would have debated the advisability of
incurring massive debt, limiting the succession of directors and
managers, and adopting and redeeming Time's poison pill.224
V. CONCLUSION
This Article sets forth a legal approach necessary to meet
the emerging need for communication between the three key
players of corporate governance: the board, longterm sharehold-
ers, and longterm stakeholders. In response to the board's new
trialogical imperative, this Article identifies a new duty for
board members: relationship management. In that capacity,
the board can serve as a catalyst and mediator for trialogue be-
tween longterm shareholders and longterm stakeholders toward
maximizing long-term corporate competitiveness and profitabil-
ity. It is our hope that corporate boards will recognize and ac-
tively pursue their inevitable role in this communication
process.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing poison pills).
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